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A New "I Do":
Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax
Shari Motro'
ABSTRACT: The federal income tax system treats married couples as if each
spouse earned approximately one-half of the couple's combined income
through a mechanism called "income splitting. " For many one-earner and
unequal-earner couples, income splitting produces a significant advantage,
a "marriage bonus," by shifting income from higher to lower rate brackets.
Marriage-based income splitting relies on a presumption that marriage is a
good indicator of economic unity between two taxpayers. It is not. Marriage
does not require spousal sharing, and many unmarried couples share
everything they earn. As a result, the current system extends the benefit of
income splitting to some taxpayers who do not deserve it while withholding it
from others who do. Because marriage is a poor proxy for economic unity,
this Article proposes a new eligibility criterion for income-splitting: only
couples legally committed to sharing their income, regardless of marital
status, would be permitted to file jointly.
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INTRODUCTION

The current "married filing jointly" federal income tax schedule
effectively treats each spouse as if he or she earns approximately one-half of
the couple's combined income. This "income splitting" mechanism
translates into a significant advantage for unequal- and one-earner couples
by shifting income from higher to lower brackets. 1 For example, a husband
and wife who earn $700,000 and $15,000 respectively owe nearly $4,000 less
in federal income taxes than an unmarried couple with the same income
2
distribution. If the wife has no income at all, the spouses' "marriage
bonus"-i.e., the difference between their tax liability and that of an
unmarried one-earner couple making $700,000-jumps to more than
$8,000. 3 Some equal-earner couples, on the other hand, suffer a "marriage
penalty"-i.e., they pay more in taxes than unmarried couples in the same
•
•
4
SituatiOn.
Why should marital status matter for tax purposes?
Traditional justifications for the current joint filing system rely on the
presumption that husband and wife form an economic unit, jointly owning
and controlling all income regardless of who nominally earned it. This
presumption is false. In fact, no necessary connection exists between marital
status and economic unity. Most states require only minimal spousal sharing,
and premarital agreements ensuring that spouses have no rights to each
other's income are no longer a rarity. Even if marriage were a reasonably
good proxy for income sharing, according to foundational income tax
principles, economic unity does not in itselfjustify income splitting.
As critics like Pamela Gann, Maijorie Kornhauser, Edward McCaffery,
and Lawrence Zelenak have demonstrated, the conceptual inconsistencies

1. The Appendix to this Article illustrates the arithmetical advantage of income splitting
for couples with widely divergent incomes.
2. Using the 2006 rate tables and standard deduction and personal exemption amounts,
the husband's tax liability as an unmarried individual taking the standard deduction (at this
income level he would not be eligible for the personal exemption), would be $223,058. The
wife's tax liability as an unmarried individual taking the standard deduction and the personal
exemption would be $655. Alternatively, the husband and wife's tax liability as a married couple
taking a double standard deduction would be $219,895.50. Thus, the difference between the
sum of their individual liabilities were they single and their liability as a married couple, is:
($223,058+$655 )-$219,895.50=$3,817.50.
3. If the wife had no income of her own, her individual liability would be 0, and the
couple's combined liability would be $214,645.50. Thus, the difference between the sum of
their individual liabilities were they single and their liability as a married couple, is: ($223,058 +
$0)-$214,645.50=$8,412.50. This calculation disregards I.R.C. § 151 (d) (3) (E) (2000).
Note that the terms "marriage bonus" and "marriage penalty" may refer to various tax
advantages and disadvantages of being married. This Article focuses exclusively on bonuses and
penalties associated with the rate structure.
4. For a discussion of the marriage penalty, which affects fewer couples than the
marriage bonus, see infra Part II.B.l.
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and the negative effects of marriage-based income-splitting would vanish if
5
Congress instituted a separate filer regime. However, though mandatory
separate filing has many appeals, it is now widely regarded as politically
6
unrealistic.
One explanation for the permanence of the income-splitting joint
return is that its main alternative, a pure separate filing regime, would
require that husbands and wives account for intra-marital transfers as either
"gifts" or "compensation." In the case of economically united spouses, such a
requirement is culturally undesirable, administratively unmanageable, and
conceptually inaccurate. We are most comfortable viewing spouses who
share their income as earning it "by and for" the marital unit rather than as
individuals. The revenue we forgo by allowing spouses to split income may
therefore be viewed as the price we are willing to pay to live in a society in
which spouses need not commodify the flow of goods and services within the
marital unit. The deviation from normative tax principles that results from
income-splitting joint returns is tolerated in order to support and enable a
unique type of relationship-a partnership of equals in which "what's mine
is yours, and what's yours is mine."
Taken to its logical conclusion, this justification suggests that the proper
criterion for income splitting should be economic unity, not marriage. Thus,
I propose that tax law consider individuals' legally binding economic status
independent of their marital status, and that only couples committed to
sharing all taxable income equally should be treated as such for tax
purposes. Rising public awareness of the discriminatory effects of marriagebased benefits, 7 growing support for the extension of many of these benefits
to unmarried couples-gay8 and straight9-and census findings over the past
5. See generally Pamela Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating Income Tax
Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REV. I (I980); Maljorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family,
Income-Sharing, and the joint Income Tax Return, 45 HAsTINGS LJ. 63 (I993); Edward]. McCaffery,
Taxation and the Family: A fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983
(1993); Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339 (1994).
6. Zelenak's latest contribution to the debate over marriage and taxes assumes that the
separate filing cause is hopeless and, more broadly, that any marriage-neutral tax system is also
"out of the question." Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REv. I, 3 (2000); see also infra note 88. This Article accepts Zelenak's first
assumption-that income splitting is here to stay-but departs from the second-the notion
that marital status must necessarily continue to serve as the eligibility criterion for income
splitting.
7. See Lisa Duggan, Holy Matrimony!, THE NATION, Feb. 26, 2004, available at
http:/ /www.thenation.com/doc/200403I5/duggan; Shari Motro, The State of the Unions; Single
and Paying for It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, at I5; Alternatives to Marriage Project,
http:/ /www.unmarried.org (last visited Mar. 23, 2006); Unmarried America: An Information
Service for the New Unmarried Majority, http:/ /www.unmarriedamerica.org (last visited Mar.
23, 2006) [hereinafter Unmarried America] (highlighting the discrepancies between married
and single statuses).
8. See Lisa Duggan & Richard Kim, Beyond Gay Marriage, THE NATION,July IS-26, 2005, at
25 ("Large majorities favor employment and housing rights for gay people (89 percent in the
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few decades that indicate a move away from traditional family structures
provide an opportunity and an imperative to reexamine the assumptions
that have undergirded the system of marriage-based joint returns for more
than fifty years.
By including economically united unmarried couples in the joint filing
system, the economic unity proposal extends income-splitting benefits to
unmarried couples in a way that is sensitive to and consistent with the beliefs

latest Gallup poll), and a clear majority of Americans support some form of partnership
recognition for same-sex couples-either marriage or civil unions (60 percent at the time of the
election)."); Kristin Eliasberg, Legal Scholars Ask if Marriage Is the Only Way to Make a Family,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 16, 2004, at E1 ("When same-sex couples across the state are finally
allowed to take their wedding vows tomorrow, some advocates say, the law will at last be
catching up with the long-standing social transformation that has made committed gay couples,
and gay families, an undeniable part of American life."); N.Y. TIMES & CBS, THE
NEW YORK
TIMES/CBS
NEWS
POLL
16
(Feb.
24-28,
2005),
available
at
http:/ /www.nytimes.com/packages/html/politics/20050303_poll/20050303_poll_results.pdf
(indicating fifty-three percent to fifty-seven percent support for some type of legal recognition
for gay couples, either marriage or civil union). Furthermore,John Tierney notes:
Opinion on gay marriage and civil unions has fluctuated over the past year, but a
Gallup poll last month showed increased support, with more than a third of
Americans in favor of gay marriage and about half in favor of civil unions. The
long-term trend has been to a great tolerance toward gays. The percentage of
Americans favoring equal rights for homosexuals in employment has risen since
1977 by more than a third to about 80 percent today. Support for gay rights has
become especially strong among young voters, which suggests that the trend will
continue.
John Tierney, A Nation Divided Who Says?, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2004, § 4 (Week in Review), at 1.
Other articles indicate:
Public support for allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally has rebounded a bit
after declining between 2003 and 2004. Today, 36% of Americans favor allowing
gays and lesbians to marry, up from 32% in December 2004. The percentage
favoring gay civil unions has risen as well. Currently, 53% favor allowing gays and
lesbians to enter into legal arrangements providing them with many of the same
rights as married couples; that compares with 48% last August.
PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, STRONG SUPPORT FOR STEM CELL RESEARCH, ABORTION
AND RIGHTS OF TERROR SUSPECTS TOP COURT ISSUES 12 (2005), available at
http:/ /pewforum.org/publications/surveys/social-issues-OS.pdf; see also Patricia A. Cain,
Dependency, Taxes, and Alternative Families, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 267, 287-88 (2002)
(summarizing examples of tax treatment based on marital status that fail to meet the goal of
supporting dependent children); Patricia A. Cain, Heterosexual Privilege and the Internal Revenue
Code, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 465, 491-95 (2000) (explaining the numerous harms associated with
preferential tax treatment for only heterosexual married people).
9. See Unmarried America, supra note 7.
10. See Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., For Richer, For Poorer: How Tax Policymakers Have
Protected and Punished American Families, 1913-2006, at 3-4 (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Iowa Law Review).
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of a m~ority of Americans-including many conservatives like President
12
11
Bush who support civil unions, but oppose gay marriage. By excluding
economically independent spouses, the proposal also comports with
conservative support for stronger marital commitments. Finally, economic
unity-based income splitting is consistent with the widely accepted public
policy goal of greater gender equality in intimate partnerships.
Part II of this Article critiques the traditional foundations for marriagebased income splitting and describes the current system's harmful effects.
Part III suggests a new theoretical foundation for income splitting-the "by
and for the couple" justification-and shows why it demands that the
current eligibility criterion for income splitting be replaced. Part IV
introduces the economic unity proposal. At its core, the proposal amounts
to a simple demand for conceptual rigor and transparency. The current
system is founded on a sentimentalized ideal of marital unity, replicating
and perpetuating the fairytale that has devastated so many dependent
spouses. The new "I do" would force the tax system to acknowledge reality,
allowing only those truly united to be taxed as one.
II. MARRIAGE-BASED INCOME SPLITTING IS INDEFENSIBLE
A.

TRADITIONAL jUSTIFICATIONS FOR INCOME SPUTTING

The U.S. federal income tax imposes taxes on realized accessions in
13
wealth over which the taxpayer has complete dominion. Increases m
wealth are generally measured by adding the taxpayer's receipts-including
wage income, interest, and gains from sales or exchanges-and subtracting
(deducting) expenditures made for the purpose of producing income-like
compensation paid to employees and the purchase of business-related
equipment. Non-business-related expenditures ("personal consumption")
and investments-like buying a candy bar and depositing money into a
14
savings account-are generally nondeductible.
11.

President George W. Bush voiced his opinion in an interview:
CHARLES GIBSON: ... the [Republican Party] platform opposes [civil unions].
PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, I don't. I view the definition of marriage different from
legal arrangements that enable people to have rights. And I strongly believe that
marriage ought to be defined as between, a union between a man and a woman.

See Interview by Charles Gibson with President George W. Bush, on Good
Morning
America,
ABC
News
Transcripts
(Oct.
26,
2004),
available
at
http:/ /www.evervigilant.net/news/gmatranscript102604.html.
12. See supra note 7.
13. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). The normative base for the
Glenshaw formulation and for the current tax system is the Haig-Simon definition of income as
the sum of consumption and savings. Though Haig-Simon provides the theoretical foundation
of our current system, many provisions deviate from the pure income tax model, rendering the
overall system a hybrid income/consumption tax. For further discussion see infra note 55.
14. I.R.C. § 262 (2000).
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The tax treatment of transfers between unmarried taxpayers generally
(though not always) follows this logic. Transfers between unmarried
individuals often fall into one of three categories for tax purposes:
compensation for business-related services, compensation for personal
services, or gifts. Compensatory transfers are distinguished from gifts for tax
purposes if they involve a quid pro quo, i.e., if they are not made out of
15
"'detached and disinterested generosity. "' Compensation for businessrelated services (everything from photocopying to strategy consulting) is
7
deductible to the payor 16 and must be included by the payee!
Compensation for personal services (like housekeeping, food preparation,
18
and hairdressing) may not be deducted by the payor and must be included
19
by the payee. Gifts have no income tax consequences to either the donor
20
21
(they are considered a form of personal consumption ) or donee.
These same categories govern situations in which one taxpayer assigns
her income to another-e.g., by directing her employer to pay part of her
salary to someone else or by contractually committing to deposit her income
into an account owned jointly with another individual. 22 In other words,
unless the assignment is characterized as compensation or other includable
form of income to the payee, it is a gift; the assignor must pay taxes on the
income and the assignee need not. One of the rationales for this
"assignment of income doctrine" is to prevent high-bracket taxpayers from
shifting income to friends and family in lower brackets, thereby lowering the
rate at which this income is taxed. If income shifting were permitted,
transfers that were in substance gifts could effectively be treated as if they
were business expenses: the donor would deduct them and the donee would
include them and pay taxes according to her own tax bracket. To prevent
this result, a guiding principle that "'income must be taxed to him who

15. Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (quoting Comm'r v. LoBue, 351 U.S.
243, 246 (1956)).
16. I.R.C. § 162(a).
17. Id. § 61(a)(1).
18. ld. § 262(a).
19. Id.§61(a)(1).
20. A man who gives his girlfriend a diamond necklace, the argument goes, is engaging in
the same type of activity as someone who buys himself a fancy car. See Pauicia A. Cain, Same-Sex
Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, 1 LAw & SEXUALI1Y97, 102-03, nn. 27-29 (1991).
21. The exclusion of gifts under I.R.C. § 102 is more difficult to square with the HaigSimon definition of income. For a discussion of why gifts are excluded from income, see 1
BORIS I. BIITKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 'l[
10.1 (2005).
22. For a discussion of assignments of income, see id. 'li 75.2.
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23

earns it"' has become, as the Supreme Court put it, "'a cornerstone of our
,,24
gra d uate d mcome tax system.
This principle was established in the famous Supreme Court case Lucas
5
v. Earl/ which was decided in 1930 before the advent of the joint return.
The case concerned Guy and Ella Earl, a one-earner married couple who
had privately contracted to share all income. The Earls claimed that each
spouse should be taxed based on one-half of Guy's income. The Supreme
Court rejected their claim on the theory that Congress intended to "tax
salaries to those who earned them," and that the Earls' contract essentially
represented an end-run around this rule, a skillful arrangement devised-as
Holmes famously put it-to attribute the fruits to "a different tree from that
. h th ey grew. ,26
on wh 1c
Lucas v. Earl still applies to most taxpayers. However, transfers between
spouses are subject to a different rule. 27 The current system disregards
28
transfers between spouses, and the rate schedules applicable to married
9
individuals filing jointll treat each spouse as if he or she earns
0
approximatell one-half of the couple's combined income through a
mechanism called "income splitting." As a result, many married couples with
unequal incomes pay less in taxes than they would if each person filed
individually, because income splitting effectively attributes income earned by
the high wage earner to the low wage earner, thereby lowering the top rate
0

23.

See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 21, at 75-110 (quoting Comm'r v. Culbertson, 337

u.s. 733, 739-40 (1949)).
24. See id. (quoting United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441,450 (1973)).
25. 281 u.s. 111 (1930).
26. !d. at 115.
27. Note that the head of household category also establishes an exception to the doctrine
for reasons that have historically related to the income-splitting joint return, though
conceptually the link is erroneous. See infra note 122.
28. I.R.C. § 1041 (2000).
29. Note that though spouses technically have the option of filing separately, in most cases
doing so imposes penalties that render separate filing rare. See TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2005
ANNUAL REPORT 424 (citing TAS RESEARCH, TAX YEAR 2003 !RTF DATA (2005)) ("Ninety seven
percent of all married filers ... submittedjoint returns for tax year 2003 .... ").Furthermore,
Bittker notes:
The split-income plan enacted in 1948 included a favorable rate schedule for joint
returns; joint returns were optional in theory, but the new rate schedule was an
offer "that could not be refused" (except in special circumstances) and this meant
that joint returns became mandatory in fact for almost all married couples.
Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1408-09 n.55
(1975) (citation omitted). This Article therefore disregards the married filing separately option.
30. When the joint return was first introduced in 1948, married taxpayers' liability was
equal to exactly that of two single taxpayers each earning one-half of the couple's combined
income. Once the special brackets for married taxpayers were introduced in 1969, "pure"
income splitting gave way to an approximation, which in turn produced a penalty for some twoearner couples. See infra Appendix.
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at which this income is taxed. 31 The resulting advantage is referred to as the
"marriage bonus." The Appendix illustrates the historical evolution of the
32
taxation of married couples from Earl v. Lucas and Poe v. Seaborn through
the 2001 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act. Although the
yearly value of marriage bonuses is difficult to measure, all estimates peg it at
tens of billions of dollars. 33
Why should married couples be subject to a special rule? Leaving aside
the historical circumstances that led Congress to institute marriage-based
income splitting, 34 four ex post facto justifications for retaining the system
have been proposed. All four rely on the false presumption that husband
and wife necessarily form an economic unit. But even if marriage were
synonymous with complete economic unity-i.e., if all husbands and wives
jointly and equally owned, controlled, managed, and consumed every dollar
of taxable income earned by either-the traditional justifications for income
splitting are conceptually inconsistent with foundational principles of the
current income tax system.
1. Joint Ownership Justification
Spouses-only income splitting is often defended as an adjustment
necessary to properly account for true changes in married taxpayers' net
worth. A husband whose non-wage-earning wife automatically owns part or
all of his income would be overtaxed, the argument goes, if he were liable
for taxes on his full salary. This approach views transfers between spouses as
different from gifts between unmarried taxpayers and from personal

31. This effect exists only in systems with a progressive rate structure. See Zelenak, supra
note 5, at 340 ("Under a progressive tax, two single persons with any given amount of combined
income will pay the lowest combined tax if their income is divided evenly between them."). This
Article presumes a progressive rate structure as a constant.
32. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
33. See jANE G. GRAVELLE, THE MARRIAGE TAX PENALlY 51-52 (2003). Gravelle explains
this difficulty:
It is not possible to measure the marriage ... bonus precisely because the taxes a

married couple would pay as two singles depends on the division of unearned
income, itemized deductions, and the custody of children. When children are
allocated based on typical observed behavior, the Congressional Budget Office has
estimated ... that ... 60% [of married couples] have bonuses ($73 billion).
!d.; see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONG., FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: MARRIAGE AND THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1 (1997) (noting that in 1996, marriage bonuses cost the federal
government approximately $33 billion in lost revenues); Ventry, supra note 10, at 4 ("In 2004,
30 million married couples received $49 billion in marriage tax 'bonuses' .... " (citing Gillette
et al., Marriage Penalties and Bonuses: A Longer-Term Perspective 1 (Dec. 2004) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Iowa Law Review))).
34. Zelenak has called the original joint return "an accident of history." Zelenak, supra
note 6, at 5. For further discussion of the historical circumstances surrounding its adoption, see
generally Carolyn C. Jones, Split Income and Separate Spheres: Tax Law and Gender Rnles in the
1940s, 6 LAw & HIST. REV. 259 (1988); Ventry, supra note 10.
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consumption expenditures, because marriage is said to change,
fundamentally and irreversibly, people's legal, emotional, and social control
over their income. Once two people marry, both spouses are viewed as
having the power to decide how income nominally earned by either will be
spent and invested. Thus, unlike the decision to buy a new car or help an
unrelated friend pay her rent, sharing income with one's spouse is not a
decision at all; it is an inescapable obligation. As Bittker put it:
Marriage affects the legal rights of each spouse to what would
otherwise be "his" or "her" unfettered income by creating an
obligation of support and restrictions on the right to transfer
property during life and at death. Since the receipt of $10,000 of
marital income does not carry with it the same rights that are
embodied in $10,000 of "single" income, these two amounts should
not necessarily be taxed as though they were identical. Instead, it is
often argued, marital income should be attributed, and taxed, one3'
half to each spouse. "
However, though marriage does create minimal support obligations, no
necessary connection exists between shared ownership over income and
marriage. In the forty-one states that apply common-law principles to
marital-property matters, the wage earner is the wage owner during
36
marriage. Thus, if husband and wife decide that she will raise the kids and
he will support the family financially, the husband is free to deposit his salary
in a separate account to which his wife has no legal entitlement. The
husband would be obligated to support the family, but the extent of this
37
support, beyond providing bare necessities, would be at his discretion.

35. Bittker, supra note 29, at 1420 (citations omitted). Before Congress extended income
splitting to all married couples, this theoretical justification propelled demands for incomesplitting tax treatment by couples in the 1920s, and it played a central role in judicial opinions
granting such treatment. When income taxes were first imposed in 1913, each taxpayer's
liability was calculated on an individual basis. The idea that marital status should affect income
tax liability was introduced by a number of couples who were legally obligated to share their
income. During early debates about the proper taxable unit, it was generally assumed that if
income splitting were appropriate at all, marriage alone did not render a couple sufficiently
economically united to justifY income splitting treatment. Something more was needed, though
there was plenty of debate over what that something was. Ella and Guy Earl, for example,
petitioners in the famous Lucas v. Earl Supreme Court case, based their income-splitting claim
on a contract they had executed as early as 1901, in which they committed to share equally all
income and property. Without the legal obligation to share income, their claim would have had
no logical basis. See id. at 1402 ("[I]t was only by equalizing their financial positions that [the
Earls] put themselves in a position to claim the tax advantage of equal-income separate
returns.").
36. See Amy C. Christian, joint and Several Liability and the joint Return: Its Implications for
Women, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 535, 546 n.75 (1998); Carolyn]. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of
Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 75, 124 (2004); Developments in the Law-The Law of Marriage and
Family, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1996, 2092 (2003) [hereinafter Developments].
37. See infra note 44.
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Should the couple divorce, the husband's earnings accumulated over the
course of the marriage would be divided according to equitable distribution
principles--often leaving the wife with a less than fifty percent share. 38

38. Professor Joan Williams notes an anomaly in the application of the equitabledistribution principles:
Statutes typically provide that marital property shall be divided based on each
spouse's contributions to the marriage; many states include homemaking either by
statute or ... by case law. Yet, in applying this law, an interesting pattern emerges.
Typically, courts treat property as jointly owned when dealing with modest estates,
where splitting the property 50/50 often forces the sale of the family home in
order to allow the husband to "get his equity out." Yet, where the estate is large,
courts in Connecticut and elsewhere traditionally use the "he who earns it, owns it"
rule, reflecting a sense that wives do not "need" half of, say, a billion dollars ....
This sense is even more explicit in the context of alimony. In ... most ... states,
wives' entitlement to alimony is explicitly based on need.
Joan Williams, Do Wives Own Half? Winning for Wive\' After Wendt, 32 CONN. L. REv. 249, 250
(1999) (citations omitted).
In the famous 1998 Connecticut case Wendt v. Wendt, corporate star Gary Wendt
divorced his wife of thirty-one years, leaving her with significantly less than fifty percent of his
earnings over the course of their marriage. His wife, Lorna, sued, demanding an equal share.
Mr. Wednt's trial testimony reveals the gulf between the husband's and the wife's perceptions of
the economic aspects of their marriage.
[Lorna Wendt's attorney:] "You had no idea [your marriage] was an equal
partnership with Lorna?"
[Mr. Wendt:] "I can't ever recall that being discussed or thought about."
[Attorney:] "You never thought about your marriage as a partnership?"
[Mr. Wendt:] "In economic terms? No, I didn't."
[Attorney:] "Did you ever tell her that?"
[Mr. Wendt:] "No, and she didn't ask."
[Attorney:] "You didn't think of your marriage as a team effort?"
[Mr. Wendt:] "No, I didn't .... [I was] totally responsible for all creation and
value of the assets .... I cannot find anything close to (justifYing] an equal
distribution ofthese assets."
[Attorney:] "Is it your view that making money is more important than raising a
child? ... You have testified that the financial contribution to the marriage was
almost all yours .... Do you believe that raising children is less important than
making money?"
[Mr. Wendt:] "Raising children should not be measured by anywhere near the
same standard as making money. I don't believe they should be measured in any
way next to each other; they are two different things."
ANN CRITIENDON, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD 137-38 (2001) (author's commentary omitted).
Note also that even if equitable-distribution law resulted in a fifty-fifty split after
marriage, basing income splitting on a future expectation of equal ownership flies in the face of
our foundational definition of income: realized accessions to wealth over which the taxpayer
has-not "is likely to have"--complete dominion. See Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S.
426, 431 (1955). Professor Marjorie Kornhauser explains the income-splitting principles of
equitable-distribution statutes in the following way:
Common-law equitable distribution statutes do not justifY income-splitting since
the rights arise only on dissolution of marriage. While the statutes might put
restraints on management during marriage, these restraints are much too limited
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In the nine community-property states, earned income acquired in the
course of the marriage (other than by gift or inheritance) is automatically
community, i.e., property in which each spouse holds an equal undivided
interest. Thus, in these states, the non-wage-earning spouse is by default
entitled to an equal share in the wage earner's income. 39 If the husband in
our example deposits his check in a separate account, the law regards that
account as jointly owned by him and his wife. That said, in some communityproperty states, taxable income from separate property (property acquired
before the marriage or through gift or devise) is taxable separately. 40
The current income-splitting rule also misses its mark because spouses
41
are free to opt out of the community-property regime. Indeed, in most
states-community or common law-the standards governing pre- and postmarital agreements have become 42 so relaxed as to render default rules
regarding marital sharing (already minimal in most states) essentially
optional. The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, promulgated in 1983
43
and, as of 2003, adopted by a majority of the states, goes so far as to allow
4
spouses to opt out of the duty of mutual support/ so long as doing so does
45
not render either party eligible for public assistance.
to impose income-splitting when the majority of control of the property still rests
with the earner.
Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 104 (citations omitted); see also Frantz & Dagan, supra note 36, at
76 n.l.
39. See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 36, at 124-25 ("[T]he basic principle of community
property is that '[t]he respective interests of the husband and wife ... during continuance of
the marriage relation are present, existing, and equal interests.' Spouses are thus equal owners of
all property acquired during marriage, regardless of how the property is nominally titled."
(quoting CAL. FAM. CODE§ 751 (West 1994)) (other citations omitted)).
40. See IRS, Internal Revenue Manual, Exhibit 25.18.1-1, Comparisons of State Law
Differences
in
Community
Property
States
(Feb.
15,
2005),
available
at
http:/ /www.irs.gov/irm/part25/ch13s01.html [hereinafter IRS Manual].
41. See id. (indicating that all community-property states recognize pre- or post- marital
property-characterization agreements); see also BIITKER & LOKKEN, supra note 21, 'II 76.2 ("Most
community-property states permit a married couple to agree that community property will be
held in separate ownership .... ").
42. \Vhen marriage-based income splitting was introduced in 1948, antenuptial
agreements were regarded as "per se invalid as contrary to the public policy of promoting
marital stability." Developments, supra note 36, at 2078.
43. See id. at 2081 n.35; Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals: From One-Size-Fits-All to Postmodern
Marriage Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1479, 1542 n.384 (2001) (citing Allison A. Marston, Note,
Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 STAN. L. REV. 887, 899 (1997) ).
44. The duty of mutual support is today largely symbolic. See Christian, supra note 36, at
540 n. 75. Christian notes:
Modern courts tend not to interfere or to enforce the husband's obligation to
support his wife except in extreme cases, like a husband refusing to pay his wife's
hospital bill. The support obligation was a creature of common Jaw, especially
before the advent of the Married Women's Property Acts. Before wives could own
property of their own, they needed, and the law provided them with, support from
their husbands. Once wives could own their own property under the Married

1522

91 IOWA LAW REVIEW

[2006]

Even if marriage did create community-property-style legal entitlements,
the shared-ownership justification does not explain why spouses, who co-own
each other's income, should be exempt from the assignment of income
doctrine. Recall that when an individual shares a portion of her income with
another taxpayer, the transfer must be characterized as gift or
compensation. Entering into a legal obligation to share income, one that
gives the recipient binding rights to it, does not in itself transform the
transfer into a deductible business expense which, arithmetically, is what
income splitting accomplishes. 46 Why then should transfers between spouses
be blessed with this automatic beneficial treatment? If the assignment of
income doctrine were applied to married couples, the law would require
husbands and wives to designate every dollar that passes between them as
either gift or compensation. Couples who share earnings equally, who have
decided that the family's income will be earned by one spouse while the
other cleans, counsels, and carpools, would be forced to allocate the
earner's fifty percent transfer into categories. As we shall see, the difficulty
and discomfort that this suggestion raises contain the kernel of what I
believe is the only rational justification for income splitting, though it does
not justify income splitting only for spouses to the exclusion of unmarried
couples legally committed to income sharing.

Women's Property Acts the support obligation under common law, although not
ceasing altogether, gradually became less important. ... Not only has the support
obligation lost importance over time, but it also is "not directly enforceable
between the parties when married. The support obligation may be enforceable
during a marriage only by third party creditors who may sue one spouse for certain
very narrow categories of debts ... undertaken by the other."
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Lave: Housework and the
Law, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 34 (1996) ); see also Henry E. Smith, Intermediate Filing in Household
Taxation, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 145, 183 (1998) ("[L]egal support obligations are very minimal and
less than adequate to protect the secondary earner's legitimate expectations of benefit from
marriage." (citation omitted)).
45. The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act provides:

If a provision of a premarital agreement modifies or eliminates spousal support
and that modification or elimination causes one party to the agreement to be
eligible for support under a program of public assistance at the time of separation
or marital dissolution, a court, notwithstanding the terms of the agreement, may
require the other party to provide support to the extent necessary to avoid that
eligibility.
UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT Acr § 6(b) (1983).
Note that the prevalence of premarital contracting is unclear. See David E. Rovella, PreNups No Longer Just for the Wealthy, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 6, 1999, at A1; Aline Sullivan, Kiss Me and
Sign Here, Darling; Demand for Prenuptial Agreements Is on the Rise, INT'L HERALD TRJB., Feb. 8,
1997, at 15. See generaUy Heather Mahar, Why Are There So Few Prenuptial Agreements?, (John M.
Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Harvard Law School, Discussion Paper No. 436 (Sept. 2003)),
available at http:/ /www.law.harvard.edu/programs/ olin_center/papers/pdf/ 436.pdf.
46. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
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Shared Consumption Justification

Legal ownership aside, income splitting is sometimes defended as an
adjustment necessary to account for behavioral patterns of shared
consumption. 47 In other words, since husband and wife normally spend the
earner spouse's income jointly and benefit from it more or less equally, the
argument goes, treating the earner as a separate individual for tax purposes
would be unfair.
But statistical evidence of marital sharing is subject to much dispute.
48
Data on income pooling within couples is scarce,
is likely to be
49
50
unreliable, and has been interpreted as supporting as well as debunking51
the marital unity paradigm.

47.

Bittker, supra note 29, at 1420-22. The Carter Commission recognizes this concept:
[T]he family is today ... the basic economic unit in society.... [A]s soon as a
marriage is contracted it is the continued income and financial position of the
family which is ordinarily of primary concern, not the income and financial position
of the individual members. Thus, the married couple itself adopts the economic
concept of the family as the income unit from the outset. . . . Family income is
normally budgeted between current and capital outlays, and major decisions
involving the Iauer are usually made jointly by the spouses.

See REPORT OF THE [CANADIAN] ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION (Carter Commission) 122-24
(1966), cited in Bittker, supra note 29, at 1393 (emphasis added).
48. See Kristen R. Heimdal & Sharon K. Houseknecht, Cohabiting and Married Couples'
Income Organization: Approaches in Sweden and the United States, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 525, 525
(2003) ("[C]ouple income organization has not received much empirical attention."); Zelenak,
supra note 5, at 348 ("There has been remarkably little empirical research into the incomesharing patterns of married couples.").
49. As Zelenak put it, "It is extremely difficult to gather reliable information on pooling
behavior, partly because of the great mass of relevant behavior, partly because of privacy
concerns, and partly because of the difficulty of interpreting behavior." Zelenak, supra note 5, at
350. It should also be noted that most studies do not distinguish between unmarried couples
who choose not to marry and those who want to marry but are not permitted to.
50. See Heimdal & Houseknecht, supra note 48, at 526 ("[F]or married couples research
has consistently found that pooling is the preferred arrangement.... 1n contrast to married
couples, the small body of literature on cohabiting couples indicates that they are more likely to
keep finances separate . . . . "); J. Treas, Money in the Bank: Transaction Costs and the Economic
Organization of Marriage, 58 AM. Soc. REV. 723 (1993), cited in Heimdal & Houseknecht, supra
note 48, at 526--27 (finding that "two thirds of married couples with a bank account kept joint
accounts only"); Linda J. Waite, Does Marriage Matter?, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 483, 498--99 (1995),
referenced in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 1058
(2004). Zelenak notes:

[P]auems of household income and expenditure indicate that most spouses have
no choice but to share roughly equally in the consumption of their combined
income .... If one accepts the premise that the crucial question in determining
the appropriate taxable unit is "Does this person pool his income with another
person for the purpose of shared consumption (and savings)?" then requiring
joint returns for married couples and separate returns for unmarried persons is an
easy-to-administer rule that gets it right most of the time.
Zelenak, supra note 5, at 353 (citations omitted).
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Even if marriage did serve as a reasonable proxy for marital sharing,
Pamela Gann, Matjorie Kornhauser, and Lawrence Zelenak have
demonstrated that the shared consumption justification for income splitting
is inconsistent with the foundational principle that income taxes should be
based on who controls income rather than who consumes it. 52
Think, for example, of three young investment bankers-Meg, Malik,
and Seymour. Each makes $100,000 per year, of which they each owe

51. See Richard C.E. Beck, The Innocent Spouse Problem: Joint and Several Liability for Income
Taxes Should Be Repealed, 43 VAND. L. REV. 317, 380 (1990) ("Shere Hite reports in a study ...
that seventy-five percent of wives who work are working at least in part for the financial
independence it brings.... These women clearly do not regard their property as belonging
equally to their husbands." (citations omitted)); Gann, supra note 5, at 26 n.97 (discussing
several articles that explore the prevalence of marital sharing); Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 9899 Uustifying the taxation of marital couples as a single taxable unit); Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing
Housework, 84 GEO. LJ. 1571, 1594 (1996) ("Most studies indicate . . . that Congress's
assumption that families operate as a single economic unit, sharing income and expenses
equally, is flawed."); Ventry, supra note 10, at 389 ("Between 1969 and 1995 ... [e]mpirical
research . . . undermined the pooling/sharing argument, finding that in most marriages,
spouses did not split intra-household allocations of income and wealth." (citations omitted)).
Even among couples who do purportedly share equally, some scholars believe that
"[b]ehind the fa<;ade of sharing is a deep-seated, though often subtle, control of the income by
the earner spouse." Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 91. As one scholar put it, "The bread-winners
are often the meat-eaters." Michael Young, The Distribution of Income Within the Family, 3 BR.].
SOC. 305, 314 (1952), cited in EDWARD LAzEAR & ROBERT MICHAEL, ALLOCATION OF INCOME
WITHIN THE HOUSEHOLD 14-15, cited in Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 80 n.51 ("Young found
that in British working-class families between World Wars I and II, the male earner gave his wife
a flat weekly allowance and disposed of the rest of the income as he wished. The wife frequently
was ignorant of how much he made and how he spent it."); see also EDWARD MCCAFFERY, TAXING
WOMEN 24 (1997) ("Many surveys and studies indicate that who earns the money matters a
great deal to the internal dynamics of families."). Also, Amy Ellen Schwartz observes:
[T]here seems to be mounting evidence that family consumption decisions do
depend upon the distribution of earnings between the husband and the wife ....
The implication for tax policy is that while the evidence may not be fully
conclusive, there is significant evidence that husbands and wives do not ignore the
source of the income in making economic decisions. That means that it may be
inappropriate to view them as a single economic unit.
Amy Ellen Schwartz, Whose Money Is It?, 16 N.Y.L. SCH.J. HUM. RTS. 135, 137 (1999) (citations
omitted).
Sharing among spouses is likely to involve consumed rather than saved income. See
Gann, supra note 5, at 26 (citing William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax,
86 HARV. L. REv. 309, 349 n.69 (1972)) ("(C]ommentators assume that equal sharing is more
likely in consumption than in savings."); see also Zelenak, supra note 6, at 28 (finding that
although "the result [of pooled marital income] is technically shared consumption, it may
[nonetheless] be skewed toward the earner's consumption preferences").
52. See Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 105 ("Under traditional income tax principles, control
typically governs taxation. The mere receipt of a benefit does not cause a person to be taxed.");
Zelenak, supra note 5, at 354-58; see also Gann, supra note 5, at 25-26 & n.93; Kornhauser, supra
note 5, at 97 ("(T]he pooling rationale is criticized because it focuses on income consumption,
which is more appropriate for a consumption-based tax than an income tax that measures
accessions to wealth." (citations omitted)).
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approximately $20,000 in taxes. Meg and Malik fall in love, move in
together, and decide to get married. Shortly after the wedding, Meg leaves
her job to fulfill a lifelong dream: becoming a trapeze artist. Malik's
$100,000 supports both himself and Meg, who now has no income. Despite
the money they are saving by splitting the rent, their lifestyle is not what it
used to be. Still, Meg is delighted and when Meg is happy, Malik is too.
Seymour, who has always dreamed of trying his hand at painting, is still hard
at work with Malik. Though he is jealous of Meg and wishes it was he who
had found love and a sugar daddy, he keeps his resentment to himself. But
come tax time, he loses his cool. It turns out that filing jointly with Meg,
54
Malik now owes some $6,000 less than Seymour on the same $100,000 of
income. Essentially, the government is subsidizing Meg's new hobby. Put
another way, the government has handed Malik $6,000 (in form of a tax
break) for no other reason than being married to someone who has opted
out of the workforce. Malik's choice to marry, and the pleasure he derives
from making it possible for Meg to do the double somersault, are personal
consumption choices that, the argument goes, should have no effect on his
55
tax liability.
Another consumption-related argument in favor of income splitting is
that married breadwinners deserve to pay less in taxes than their single coworkers because their paycheck supports an additional person. This
argument does not logically justifY income splitting. First, the satisfaction of
support obligations often does not produce fifty-fifty joint consumption.

53. Using 2006 tax rate tables and inflation adjusted figures for the standard deduction,
each individual taxpayer making $100,000 has a taxable income of $100,000 minus $5,150 (the
standard deduction), minus $3,300 (the personal exemption), i.e., $91,550. Applying the rate
table to this amount yields taxes owed of $15,107.50 plus 28% of the excess of $91,550 over
$74,200, i.e., $19,965.50.
54. Married taxpayers making $100,000 have a taxable income of $100,000 minus $10,300
(twice the standard deduction), minus $6,600 (twice the personal exemption), i.e., $83,100.
Their tax is: $8,180 plus 25% of the excess of$83,100 over $61,300, i.e., $13,890.
55. This objection to the consumption-based justification for income splitting is prone to
attack for relying on an outmoded conception of the U.S. income tax system. Though it is true
that our system is based on realized accretions of wealth, the Internal Revenue Code is riddled
with provisions that deviate from this ideal. In a perfect accretion system, all outlays that are not
costs of producing income (i.e., all "personal expenses") would have no effect on the measure
of taxable income. Though the statute codifies this principle as a general rule, l.R.C. § 262
(2002), it carves out numerous exceptions to it. For example, interest on a home mortgage,
I.R.C. § 163(h), interest on student loans, l.R.C. § 221, and charitable contributions, I.R.C. §
170, are deductible despite their personal nature.
The primary justification for these exceptions is that they are designed to encourage
activities that stand to benefit all of society. Congress has identified home-ownership, education,
and charitable giving as societal goods, the benefits of which outweigh unfairness to taxpayers
who are unable to use these deductions and who therefore owe taxes on a greater portion of
their income. Some people feel that this rationale holds equally true for marriage. However, if
the raison d'etre of marriage-based income splitting is marriage promotion, it represents an
inefficient means of achieving this goal. See infra Part Il.A.5.
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Second, even if it did, for the same reasons outlined above, shared
consumption does not justify income splitting in a system founded on the
principle that fruits should not be "attributed to a different tree from that
56
on which they grew." That said, support obligations may well justify a
reduction in tax liability through dependency exemptions that constitute
acknowledged public policy-based deviations from the attribution
. . I e. s7
pnnCip
3.

Collective Efforts Justification

A third traditional justification for spouses-only income splitting is that
in addition to changing individuals' control over how they consume or
invest their income, marriage turns independent economic agents into
business partners of sorts. Spouses' monetary and non-monetary
contributions to the marital unit are said to be inextricably linked; income
nominally earned by either spouse therefore reflects the combined efforts of
both. From this perspective, a non-wage-earning wife who provides services
as homemaker, confidante, and companion to business-related events is
performing one piece of a collective income-producing effort. A wageearning husband who splits his income with a non-earner wife is simply
58
handing over her fair share of the fruits of their combined labor. A tax
system that permits married couples to income split comports with this
presumed collective-income-producing reality. 59
56. Lucasv.Ear1,281 U.S.l11, l15 (1930).
57. For a discussion of the relationship between dependency exemptions and income
splitting, see infra note 122 and accompanying text.
58. As one marriage manual published in the 1940s-a time when the logic behind
income splitting was being hotly debated-put it:
A salary check is made payable to the husband. For this reason, many men assume
that they alone earn that salary. If the wife cares for the home, children, and
husband; is an expert in consumption; makes social contacts that assist the
husband in his profession or broaden family experience; is a companion who
enriches his life, stirs his ambitions, aids him in his work, gives him something to
work for, do they not earn the income jointly? ... She need not feel that she is a
parasite. She and her husband are partners in an enterprise that includes both her
work and his as component parts.
HENRY BOWMAN, MARRIAGE FOR MODERNS 370 (2d ed. 1948), quoted in Jones, supra note 34, at
281-82 & n.159; see also John L. McClellan, Where You Pay Less Income Tax, AM. MAG., Jan. 1948,
at 37, quoted in Jones, supra note 34, at 271 & n.85 (noting that Arkansas Senator John L.
McClellan stated the following regarding community property: "The law says, and most
husbands will agree, that a wife's mental and physical labor at home is a 50 percent
contribution and she should be properly paid").
59. See Bittker, supra note 29, at 1420 ("The rationale [for income splitting] is not only
that the legal incidents of marital income are divided between the two spouses, but also that
they both contribute to its realization."); see also Ventry, supra note 10, at 87 ("(C]ommunity
property law was 'based on the theory that the women at home are keeping the home fires
going, and that they are actually responsible for the accumulation of part of the property.'"
(quoting Community Property Income: Hearings on H.R 8396 Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on
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But this "collective-efforts" justification also contradicts principles
applicable to unmarried taxpayers; even when taxpayers share income fiftyfifty, they are not permitted to (effectively) income split unless both are
equally responsible for the production of income.
Consider Mr. CEO who earns $800,000 and whose wife has no
independent income. Wife accompanies Mr. CEO to dinners and
conferences, advises him on everything from dress to long-term strategy,
runs the household, and raises their five children. The couple shares all
income fifty-fifty-meaning that the wife has full rights over $400,000 of the
husband's $800,000 salary. Is this $400,000 compensation for services?
Personal or business-related? How much of it is a gift? If a full one-half of the
husband's income were attributable to the wife's labor, he could hire her,
pay her one-half of "his" earnings, and deduct the payments as business
expenses under section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code, producing the
.
. 60 But m
. many cases t h e mar ket vaIue 61
same en d resu l t as mcome
sp 1·ItUng.
of the non-earner spouse's labor preformed strictly in the service of the
earner-spouse's income production (which excludes "private sphere" labor
like childrearing) is far smaller than one-half of the earner's income.
According to the logic of the income tax, every one of the $400,000
transferred by Mr. CEO to his wife is theoretically allocable to one of the
three categories and should be treated accordingly. But because they are
married, our couple need not make this calculation; income splitting
effectively treats transfers that would normally be deemed gifts or payments
for personal services as if they were business-related compensation, giving
the couple something that, according to the tax logic applicable to
individuals, they do not deserve.
4.

Couples Neutrality Justification

Finally, marriage-based income splitting is frequently defended as a
means of preserving "couples neutrality." Couples neutrality derives from
the principle of "horizontal equity," the notion that people in similar
economic posiUons should be treated similarly for tax purposes.
Accordingly, couples neutrality requires that as merged economic units,
couples with the same combined income should owe the same taxes

Ways and Means, 73d Cong. 137 (1934) (statement of Charles E. Dunbar, Jr., Lousiana
Community Property Taxpayer's Committee))).
60. Note that if the husband is not self-employed, the payments to his wife would have to
be made directly by his employer. Another possibility for achieving the same result would be for
husband and wife to form a partnership. See Bn-rKER & LOKKEN, supra note 21, 1 75.2.2.
61. Market value may of course have no relationship with the value of this labor from a
vantage point internal to the marriage. Indeed, it may often be regarded as more valuable, as in
case of a stay-at-home mother who could earn more than her husband in the market place but
who prioritizes childrearing over income.
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62

regardless of the distribution of income between the spouses. For example,
if couples neutrality is preserved, a husband and wife who make $80,000 and
$20,000 respectively ought to bear the same tax burden as a husband and
wife who each make $50,000 or a one-earner couple whose breadwinner
63
makes $100,000.
Couples neutrality is flawed because, again, it relies on the false premise
that marriage equals economic unity. A one-earner $100,000-a-year couple
who share everything is in a fundamentally different position than a
husband and wife with the same income profile who share a negligible
portion of the earner's income. Leaving aside the assignment of income
problems discussed above, equalizing treatment of economically united and
financially independent marital units flies in the face of basic equity
principles: the non-sharing high earner spouse receives a windfall compared
with an unmarried co-worker who earns, owns, and consumes the same
amount. 64
Notwithstanding the false marital unity premise on which it is based, the
couples neutrality justification is also problematic because, by equalizing
treatment of couples based on their combined incomes, income-splitting
exacerbates distortions attributable to the nontaxation of non-wage labor
performed within the married unit. As a result, the couples neutrality
justification does not hold with respect to couples who spend different
amounts of time performing wage labor. 65 For example, a one-earner couple
62. See Gann, supra note 5, at 25; Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 63, 96; Zelenak, supra note
5, at 344.
63. As a historical matter, couples neutrality did not play into Congress's 1948 decision to
extend income splitting to all married couples. Nevertheless, it has taken center stage in afterthe-fact justifications of the joint return. See Zelenak, supra note 6, at 5 ("Despite the
overwhelming evidence that the original joint return was an accident of history rather than a
principled enactment of couples neutrality, in the years since 1948 couples neutrality has
become the standard justification for joint returns."); see also Gann, supra note 5, at 24; Zelenak,
supra note 6, at 5 n.21.
64. Recall, for example, Meg and Malik from the scenario above. Meg makes nothing as a
budding trapeze artist. Malik earns $100,000 per year. Assume this time that Malik is less than
thrilled at the prospect of becoming the only wage earner in the family. He gives Meg an
allowance that is enough to cover only her basic needs, but otherwise invests most of his income
in his own stock portfolio. Tensions mount and they decide, amicably, to take a break. Meg
moves in with a lion tamer. Still, she remains married to Malik, and they continue filing jointly
because of the $6,000 taX advantage.
Since pooling becomes less prevalent as income levels rise, and since the breadwinner
in one-earner families is usually the husband, the extension of income splitting to economically
separate spouses is especially beneficial for rich, tight-fisted men.
65. Boris Bittker has argued that the failure to rax imputed income is a system-wide
problem, not a unique result of couples neutrality and therefore should not affect debates
about taxing married taXpayers as a unit. Bittker, supra note 29, at 1426, 1435. However, Edward
McCaffery has insisted that the distortions attributable to the non taxation of imputed income
are particularly harmful in the context of comparisons between one-earner and two-earner
couples. By ignoring the effects of social and legal realities that deter secondary earners from
entering the labor force, couples neutrality is not neutral as between different models of the
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in which the non-earning spouse contributes household and childcare
services to the marital unit is better off than a two-earner couple that hires a
maid and a babysitter. If both couples' combined incomes are $100,000, the
one-earner couple gets to keep more of this income because the non-earner
spouse has essentially added to the couple's disposable income by making it
unnecessary for them to pay for these services, while the two-earner couple
will not be allowed to deduct these services as a business expense. The fact
that our system does not tax this additional "imputed income" 66 and treats
all married couples with the same combined income equally, gives oneearner couples a significant advantage over two-earners.
5.

Note Regarding Marriage Promotion Initiatives

Most tax policy scholars believe that absent compelling public policy
reasons to the contrary, tax law should interfere as little as possible with
people's behavior. Accordingly, over the years most critics have regarded the
marriage bonus created by income splitting as an undesirable but tolerable
side effect of the law's attempt to accommodate competing principles. 5 7 The
justifications presented above may be understood as attempts to excuse an
aspect of income splitting regarded as a defect. But outside of academia, the
principle of marriage neutrality is not necessarily taken for granted. Some
people believe that the government should actively promote marriage, and
that the benefits of marriage-based income splitting present an appropriate
means of doing so. Though Congress did not create the "marriage bonus" as
a marriage-promotion vehicle, many politicians and their constituents have
grown to view it and defend it as such. President George W. Bush, for
example, whose "marriage penalty relief' plan increased marriage bonuses, 68
has said: "I like to remind people that the tax code ought to encourage
marriage, not discourage marriage .... Seems like we want people to stay
married, and the tax code ought to encourage that." 69
family. McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1009-10 ("[W]e are exalting single-earner households over
all competing visions."). Lawrence Zelenak agrees that the imputed-income problem
"undercut[s] the argument that joint returns achieve neutrality among equal-income couples."
Zelenak, supra note 5, at 363; see also Gann, supra note 5, at 8, 30.
Note, however, that the imputed-income problem in this context could be addressed
by reinstituting the two-earner deduction.
66. For a discussion of the reasons for the nontaxation of household labor-"difficulties
with valuation, liquidity, and commodification"-see Staudt, supra note 51, at 1577-79. Staudt
critiques this conventional wisdom, suggesting that Congress values and taxes nonmarket labor
in the same manner as market labor. Id. at 1574.
67. See Bittker, supra note 29, at 1395 ("[G]iven a progressive rate schedule, a marriageneutral tax system cannot be reconciled with a regime of equal taxes for equal-income married
couples.").
68. See Appendix.
69. President George W. Bush, President Discusses Economy, Urges Congress to Make Tax
Cuts Permanent (Feb. 19, 2004), available at http:/ /www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2004/02/20040219-4.html. On another occasion, the President declared that "[w]e
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Government-sponsored marriage-promotion mttiatives are extremely
0
controversial/ but even if one accepts the premise that "the tax code ought
to encourage marriage," marriage-based income splitting presents a
remarkably inefficient means of doing so because its benefits are unlikely to
reach its main target population. The main beneficiaries of the marriage
bonus are high-income couples. But one of the pillars of the marriagepromotion philosophy is that government incentives for marriage are
71
justified because marriage functions as a panacea to poverty. It follows that
those who are arguably most acutely in need of the palliative effects of
marriage are those least likely to benefit from marriage bonuses and
therefore least likely to be induced to marry because of them.
Furthermore, marriage-promotion advocates generally do not support
an "anything goes" interpretation of marriage. In fact, the assumption that
marriage should be a partnership of equals, not a subordination
relationship, hovers in the background of several "pro-marriage" writings. As
Family Research Council senior fellow Charmaine Yoest put it in a piece
arguing for a return to 1948-style "pure income splitting," 72 "When
conservatives cast income splitting as a path to full partnership for women,
73
they are invoking ideals shared by feminists." Since civil marriage does not
want to reward and honor marriage." President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President to
the Greater Manchester Chamber of Commerce (Oct. 9, 2003), available at
http://www. whitehouse.govI news/ releases/2003/ 10/20031 009-15.html.
According to this view, Malik's decision to legally commit to Meg should be
encouraged and rewarded; the societal benefits that accrue from turning unmarried couples
into spouses are well worth the resulting unfairness to singles like Seymour.
70. See Theodora Ooms, The Rnle of the Federal Government in Strengthening Marriage, 9 VA. J.
Soc. POL'Y & L. 163, 175-76 (2001); Katherine Boo, The Marriage Cure, THE NEW YORKER, Aug.
18, 2003, at 105.
71. See LINDA]. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CAsE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY MARRIED
PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY 172 (2000); Ooms, supra note
70, at 183-85; Boo, supra note 70, at 105.
72. For a discussion of pure income splitting, see the Appendix.
73. Charmaine Yoest, Income Splitting: Resturing Marriage Support in the Tax Code, 1 FAM.
POL'Y REV. 37, 57 (2003); see also WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 71, at 172. Waite and
Gallagher query:
[I]s the full-time employment of wives in a high-earning job ... the only route to a
"fair" marriage? Can we have equal marriages with an employed father and a
mother who works only in the home or works part-time? Steven Nock argues that
coercion and inequity, not dependency, lie at the heart of the problems of
traditional marriage. Dependency is not the enemy. In fact, marriage gets much of
its power from the interdependency that allows each spouse to specialize. Marriage
works best when husbands and wives need each other. But to achieve this
alternative vision of the new family, dependencies must be freely chosen, not
coerced. Both partners need to be protected against the risks inherent in even
freely chosen dependency. And husband and wife must recognize themselves both
as dependents in their joint project, the family-even if they have very different
incomes or one has no income at all for a period. This recognition of marriage as
true partnership, an interdependent relationship rather than one of domination
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necessarily translate into a serious legal and financial commitment,
government programs that privilege even the most tenuous of marriages
may do more harm than good to conservative efforts to "revitalize" marriage.
That said, as we shall see in Part III, Americans' ideal of marriage as a
financial partnership does explain the persistence of the income-splitting
joint return; it also points the way towards a more logical approach to
income splitting.
B.

NEGATIVE SIDE EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE-BASED INCOME SPUTTING

1.

The Marriage Penalty

The. current system of marriage-based joint returns is not only
theoretically unsound. It also produces a host of negative side effects, the
most well-known of which is the much-maligned "marriage penalty"-the
fact that some couples owe more in taxes once they are married than they
would have owed had they remained single. The penalty disadvantages
married couples who are in the same economic position as their unmarried
counterparts, and it may interfere with couples' decisions to marry or
74
divorce.
The penalty represents an unintended side effect of Congress's effort to
reduce the size of the marriage bonus that resulted from its first experiment
with income splitting. The 1948 Revenue Act introduced what is known as
"pure income splitting"-spouses filing jointly paid exactly what they would
have paid had each spouse earned one-half of the combined income of the
couple as separate individuals (the married-filingjointly brackets were twice
as wide as those applicable to individuals). This meant that some taxpayers
enjoyed a tax savings of some forty percent as a result of being married. 75
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 lessened the bonus by narrowing the tax
brackets for married couples. As a result, the tax due on a married couple's
combined income was somewhat greater than twice the amount owed by a
single taxpayer earning half as much. That is, pure income splitting gave way
to a scaled-back version of income splitting. This had the effect of reducing
the marriage bonus (enjoyed by one-earner couples and couples with
unequal incomes), but it also created a penalty for couples with equal
incomes, who now paid more as marrieds than they would as singles. The

and subordination, has implications outside the home as well, affecting ... how we
treat married couples in the tax code as well as the divorce court.
/d. (citations omitted).
74. See generally James Aim & Leslie A. Whittington, For Love or Money? The Impact of Income
Taxes on Marriage, 66 ECONOMICA 297 ( 1999), quoted in George W. Dent, Jr., Traditional Marriage:
Still Worth Defending, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 419, 423 n.21 (2004).
75. MICHAEL GRAETZ, THE U.S. INCOME TAX 31-32 (1999).
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2001 Act reduced the penalty by reverting to pure income splitting, but only
at low-income levels. The change also increased marriage bonuses. 76
2.

The Innocent-Spouse Problem

The current income-splitting paradigm also potentially imposes an
unfair liability on low- and non-earner spouses who have no legal
entitlement to the income on which they are taxed (the "innocent spouse"
problem). In order to take advantage of the benefits of income splitting, the
high-earning taxpayer must file a joint return with his or her spouse, making
both spouses jointly and severally liable for any taxes due on the return
(including deficiencies that may emerge years later and regardless of
77
whether the couple stays married) . Every year, taxpayers abandoned by taxcheating spouses find themselves owing thousands of dollars to the IRS. The
. . o fth em are women. 78
vast maJonty
The joint-liability rule is sometimes erroneously defended as the price
married taxpayers must pay for the benefits of income splitting. 79 But the
logic of this justification only holds if income splitting for tax purposes were
contingent upon income splitting as a matter of actual legal entitlements. As
we have seen, income splitting for tax purposes does not require that
couples share legal entitlement to income. Neither does filing a joint return

76. See the Appendix for an explanation.
77. See generally BIITKER & LOKKEN, supra note 21, 'II 111.3.2.
78. See Charles Delafuente, Your Taxes: My Spouse Did What on Our Federal Tax Return?, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005, § 3, at 33. Delafuente reports:
At the root of an innocent spouse claim, there is typically an I.R.S. finding that
income has been underreported or that deductions or credits have been
overstated. In such situations, the I.R.S. demands more tax; often, the I.R.S. tries to
collect it from the spouse with easier-to-find income, like salary. That personmost commonly a wife, according to tax professionals-may file for innocentspouse status.
/d. The article goes on to report CCH tax analyst Mark Luscombe as saying that some seventyfive percent of the court cases he has looked at involved women seeking relief. /d.; see also
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 29, at 422; Beck, supra note 51, at 320 n.4 (noting that
over ninety percent of the reported innocent spouse cases in 1987 involved wives who were
forced to pay their husbands' taxes).
79. In fact, joint return liability was enacted on the basis of administrative necessity, and it
applies to all taxpayers filing joint returns, whether or not they benefit from income splitting.
See Beck, supra note 51, Parts IV.F, VI.A.
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"effect a conveyance of the earnings from one spouse to the other for
80
ownership purposes." As a result, as Richard Beck explains:
The cost of joint liability usually is paid by the wrong person. The
husband ordinarily benefits most (or exclusively ... ) from income
splitting as the higher or sole earner, but it is the wife who incurs
the larger additional liability for his taxes. She may herself receive
little or no benefit from the tax saving, unless one makes the
assumption that reducing the husband's taxes always directly
benefits the wife. 81
The root cause of the innocent-spouse problem-the prevalence of
spousal abandonment-of course has nothing to do with taxes. However,
the current tax system exacerbates dependent spouses' vulnerability by
making them liable for taxes on income they never earned and never
owned. Under certain circumstances, innocent spouses may be relieved of
their tax liability, but the numerous restrictions contained in the Code's
innocent spouse relief provisions still force many low- and non-earning
spouses, mostly abandoned wives, to shoulder their husbands' debt. 82
The current system also hurts "innocent spouses" by reinforcing the
fairytale that spouses are an economic unit. Many people are likely unaware
that in most states the default rule is that spouses own their income
separately and that divorce often does not result in a fifty-fifty split of assets.
It would not be unreasonable for a non-earner spouse signing a joint return
to associate joint-tax liability with joint ownership of the income that
generated the liability. 83

80.

Christian, supra note 36, at 586 & n.253. As Richard Beck put it:

Aggregating income and deductions for purposes of computing the tax neither
requires nor creates any actual sharing of property. Couples are permitted to file
jointly even under circumstances in which it is obvious that they have no intention
of sharing anything. There is no requirement, for example, that a couple even be
living together in order to file a joint return.
Beck, supra note 51, at 378 (citations omitted).
81. Beck, supra note 51, at 376 (citations omitted).
82. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 21, , 111.3.2 (detailing the new innocent spouse
relief requirements set out by Section 6015); see also Delafuente, supra note 78, § 3, at 33
(reporting that an I.R.S. spokesman said that "in fiscal year 2004, there were 51,988 applications
for innocent-spouse relief, and that 9, 788 were granted and an additional 3,804 partially
granted"); Tom Herman, IRS Makes It Tougher for Spouses to Claim Innocence in Tax Fraud, WALL
ST.j., Mar. 15, 2006, at Dl. Delafuente also notes that "[q]ualif)'ing as an innocent spouse is no
simple matter . . . for people who are still married, [and] the law can be a minefield."
Delafuente, supra note 78, § 3, at 33. For a recent proposal limiting lower income spouses'
liability, see TAXPAYERADVOC'ATE SERV., supra note 29, at 407-32.
83. According to the Taxpayer Advocate Service:
Many married taxpayers are probably unaware that they may avoid joint and
several liability by filing separately. Form 1040 ... does not warn taxpayers that
filing a joint return will result in joint liability. Although the Form 1040 instruction
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The Stacking Effect-Disincentive for "Secondary Earners"
to Enter Paid Workforce

The current income-splitting joint return also creates a disincentive for
"secondary earners" (taxpayers whose earning potential is low relative to
their spouses') to enter the paid workforce because their earnings would be
taxed at prohibitively high marginal rates. When couples file jointly, the lowearner's income must be "stacked" on top of the high-earner's income,
subjecting it to taxes at the highest marginal rate applicable to the couple's
combined income. In some cases this makes it more expensive for the
spouse with the lower earning potential to work for a salary than to stay at
home, providing untaxed non-wage labor that the couple would otherwise
pay for with after-tax dollars. This "stacking effect" has been seen as a
penalty on working wives because women are more likely to be cast as
secondary earners. 84
4.

Marital Status Discrimination

Finally, marriage-based income splitting discriminates against
unmarried couples, some of whom are indistinguishable from married
couples in terms of their economic, emotional, and legal commitments to
each other. While most public attention regarding marital status
discrimination has focused on same-sex couples who are not able to marry
or whose marriages are not recognized under federallaw, 85 many committed
booklet discloses that joint filing may subject a taxpayer to JOint and several
liability, it offers a "tip," that taxpayers should "chose the one [filing status] that
will give you the lowest tax." Of course, taxpayers who have delegated responsibility
for family tax preparation to a spouse are unlikely to read the instruction booklet.
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 29, at 24 (citations omitted).
84. As McCaffery explains:
[T)he rate structure encourages families to think in terms of a primary and a
secondary worker, because there is one rate schedule applied to couples.... There
are strong disincentives against second earners working in the paid workforce at
all, because they enter it at high marginal rates. Since wives
are overwhelmingly likely to be the secondary earner in potential two-earner
families ... this burden falls on women.
MCCAFFERY, supra note 51, at 19-20.
It is worth noting that the stacking effect is sometimes mistakenly described as a
symptom of the marriage penalty. In fact, it is an outcome of the joint-filer system. See Zelenak,
supra note 6, at 20.
85. See Ginia Bellafante, Two Fathers, with One Happy to Stay at Home, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,
2004, at A3; Howard D. Medwed, 'Lawrence' Has Little f-jfect on Taxes, for Now; The Defense of
Marriage Act Prevents Same-Sex Couples from Enjoying Many Fecleral Law Perks, NAT'L LJ., Mar. 1,
2004, at 15 ("Same-sex households typically function as a single economic unit in much the
same way as traditional spousal relationships."). Note also that model "living together"
contracts, many of which formalize property sharing arrangements, abound. See, e.g., TONI
IHARA ET AL, LIVING TOGETHER: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR UNMARRIED COUPLES 6/10 (11th ed.
2001).
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heterosexual couples choose not to marry for a variety of religious, cultural,
and economic reasons, including potential loss of Social Security benefits. 86
III. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FOR INCOME SPLITTING RECONSIDERED

A.
1.

SPOUSES LABORING BY AND FOR THE MARITAL UNIT

Separate Filing Is Not a Realistic Alternative

The theoretical and practical problems outlined in Part II have led
many critics to propose replacing joint filing with a separate-filing regime. 87
In a single-filer system each wage earner would be liable for taxes on her
individual income, regardless of marital status and regardless of whether she
chooses to share her income with a partner. Separate filing would overcome
all of the problems outlined above.
But separate filing is not a realistic option for short-term reform. 88
Americans generally believe that couples deserve special treatment, 89 and
every federal income tax bill adopted since 1948 has preserved income

86. See generally DORIAN SOLOT & MARsHALL MILLER, UNMARRIED TO EACH OTHER: THE
ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO LIVING TOGETHER AS AN UNMARRIED COUPLE (2002); Michael j. Brien et
a!., Widows Waiting to Wed? (Re)Marriage and Economic Incentives in Social Security Widow Benefits, 39
j. HUM. RESOURCES 585 (2004).
87. See Alicia Munnell, The Couple Versus the Individual Under the Federal Personal Income Tax,
in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 247-78 (Henry j. Aaron & Michael]. Boskin eds., 1980); Bruce
Bartlett, Recent Proposals Relating to Family Taxation, 91 TAX NOTES 153, 154 n.6 (2001) (citing
Laura Ann Davis, A Feminist justification for the Adoption of an Individual Filing System, 62 S. CAL. L.
REv. 197 (1988)). See generally Gann, supra note 5; Kornhauser, supra note 5; McCaffery, supra
note 5; Harvey Rosen, Is It Time to Abandon joint Filing?, 30 NAT'L TAX]. 423 (1970); Zelenak,
supra note 5.
88. See Zelenak, supra note 6, at 2-3 ("Although mandatory separate returns for all
taxpayers would eliminate all marriage penalties (and all marriage bonuses), that does not seem
to be a political possibility in the near future."); see also Bartlett, supra note 87, at 154 ("[T]he
sensible thing to do would be to adopt a system in which the individual, rather than the family,
is the basic unit of taxation .... Of course, a major consequence of this would be to eliminate
existing marriage bonuses from the tax code. This is never going to happen .... " (citations
omitted)).
89. Even some of those dedicated to fighting marital status discrimination often punt on
the conflict of interests between "solo singles'" (i.e., unpartnered singles) and unmarried
couples' interests. Logically speaking, solo singles should oppose all benefits contingent on any
relationship between two able-bodied adults (what Martha Fineman calls "horizontal
relationships")-marriage, domestic partnership, or civil union. See infra note 106. Support
relationships between earners and those unable to provide for themselves are a different
matter. I d. But some singles advocates back into the argument that any reforms that chip away
at marital status discrimination are better than nothing. See Unmarried America, supra note 7.
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splitting m some form or another. 90 The current system and all politically
realistic proposals to reform it embody the notion that spouses deserve to be
treated as merged economic units for tax purposes through some form of
joint filing, the results of which approximate income splitting. 91
Why are we as a society so attached to income splitting and how might
the cultural underpinnings of joint filing guide our efforts to reform the
current system? One reason for popular support for retaining the basic
elements of the current joint return is that once income splitting was
extended to all married couples, removing it came to be perceived as a tax
hike on married couples. 92
Separate filing is also unacceptable for reasons that go beyond loss
aversion. Ignoring marital status and treating spouses in accordance with the
rules applicable to unrelated taxpayers would, at least theoretically, force
couples to commodify the flow of goods and services within the relationship.

90. Dennis Ventry suggests that the longevity of the income-splitting joint return may be
understood in light of "[t]he path dependent nature of tax policymaking." Ventry, supra note
10, at 15. Furthermore, Ventry notes:
[C]hoices made in 1948 created a group of taxpayers that jealously guarded its tax
benefits. While society evolved in the latter half [sic] the twentieth century, this
group resisted change. Even as tax experts criticized the joint return for
contributing to marriage penalties, work disincentives, and other tax inequities,
policymakers preferred extending favorable tax treatment to new groups of
taxpayers rather than to taking away existing tax benefits.
!d.; see also id. at 352 (noting Senator Eugene McCarthy's observation that "[i]t was
'unrealistic' ... 'to require married couples to give up income splitting [because] (t]he practice
is too deeply embedded in the system'" (quoting 115 CONG. REc. 22,859 (1969)) ).
91. Ventry notes that policymakers responsible for the 2001 Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act:

[A]dhered to the longstanding allegiance to joint filing and income splitting. So
long as individual filing remained absent from the policy agenda, no amount of
piecemeal marriage penalty relief would eliminate the problem. Experts roundly
criticized joint filing for reflecting and reinforcing a bygone era where men
worked and women stayed home. Many experts acquiesced to the broad political
support for joint filing, however, and endorsed incremental reforms. A few
experts, particularly feminist legal scholars, persisted in advocating the abolition of
the joint return. But they failed to generate support beyond a small circle of likeminded experts. Beginning in the mid-1990s, conservatives appeared prepared to
join feminists and liberals in a campaign against joint filing. Conservatives attacked
marriage tax penalties for undermining the institution of marriage, encouraging
divorce, and threatening the American family. But once conservatives realized that
removing marriage tax penalties also meant removing barriers to work for married
women, they opted for more moderate forms of marriage penalty relief.
Institutional constraints reinforced social fears. Neither the [P]resident nor
Congressional leaders advocated abolishing the joint return, recoiling at the
prospect of having to create losers in the tax policymaking game. Rather than take
away marriage tax bonuses, policymakers preserved and extended the bounty.
!d. at 387-88 (citations omitted).
92. See supra note 84.
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In other words, separate filing strictly applied would require transfers that
are neither purely altruistic nor pure bargained-for exchanges to be
93
characterized as either gifts or compensation. Applying such a requirement
to couples that share all income would impose administrative and psychic
94
burdens that as a society we would rather avoid. This is especially true with
respect to couples that share support obligations (like parents or coguardians) because it is especially hard and, some commentators argue,
undesirable to force couples to place a dollar value on the non-wage labor of
primary caregivers, most of whom are women. 95
Consider, for example, a best-selling science fiction author married to a
chess master turned stay-at-home mother who, on occasion, helps him
brainstorm about his plots. In a single-filer world, the husband would hire
his wife as a research assistant and pay her a portion of his royalties as
compensation, producing a business deduction for him and taxable income
for her, thereby shifting high-bracket income to a lower bracket. Assuming
the couple shares all of the husband's income, the question then would be
how much of the fifty percent of the husband's earnings transferred to the
wife may be categorized as a business expense. In other words, how much is
wife-as-sounding board worth? How should her ideas be valued? If the
93. For a discussion of the difficulty in classifYing transfers between intimate parmers into
categories applicable to unrelated parties, see Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange,
119 HARV. L. REv. 492, 493 (2005) ("Economic exchange between intimates . . . involves
bargaining as well as altruism."). Hasday proposes a new term, "structured altruism," to describe
transfers that are neither pure gift nor pure quid pro quo exchange as a category onto itself. !d.
Hasday posits:
[T]he social exchange of economic assets between intimates often assumes the
form of what one could term structured altruism. A classic definition of altruism
might be that it is a spontaneous act done selflessly for the welfare of another.
Structured altruism, however, is neither entirely spontaneous nor entirely selfless.
Anthropologists have discovered that many economic assets are exchanged
between intimates in the form of gifts. This practice of gift exchange, though,
involves at least implicit bargaining and self-interest in addition to altruism.
!d. at 497.
94. See Bruce Wolk, Federal Tax Consequences of Wealth Transfers Between Unmarried
Cohabitants, 27 UCLA L. REv. 1240, 1247 (1980) (stating that "the application of marketplace
notions to quasi-familial transactions for which such notions are often singularly inappropriate"
yields "absurd" results); see also ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF
INTIMATE LIFE 104-18 (2003) (discussing a wide array of cultural understandings regarding
interspousal gifts); Cain, supra note 20, at 101 (calling the application of arms length
transactional principles to spousal transfers the "'fallacy of individualism'"); Zelenak, supra note
5, at 381-94 (discussing allocation problems in designing a separate-return system).
95. As Elizabeth Anderson put it, "When women's labor is treated as a commodity, the
women who perform it are degraded." Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women's Labor a Commodity?, 19
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71, 75 (1990), quoted in Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women's
Household Labor, 9 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 81, 85 & n.l6 (1997); see also Staudt, supra note 51, at
1633 ("Feminist commentators . . . are concerned that valuing . . . household labor would
commodity and demean women . . . ."). On commodification, see generally Margaret Jane
Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987).
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couple is truly one economic unit, they will want to put as high a value as
possible on her business-related contributions because these translate into a
tax savings. The value of the wife's cooking, cleaning, and childcare services
performed for the husband, on the other hand, produce a tax hit; the
husband's "payments" for these are not deductible from his income but
must be included in hers, meaning that as a couple, our husband and wife
would be paying taxes twice on the same income. Logically then, they will
want to minimize their valuation of the stay-at-home-wife's housework. What
are the social consequences of setting up this type of incentive structure? Do
we really want spouses who view each other as equal partners to put a dollar
value on their mutual contributions? Do we want a regime in which spouses
have to justify the way in which they characterize their contributions to the
taxing authorities?
2.

Quasi-Separate Filing Is Inconsistent with Society's View of Marriage

The commodification problem inherent in a pure separate-filing
regime could be cured through a hybrid separate/joint-filing system taxing
each individual separately but disregarding transfers between spouses that
would normally be classified as compensation. This is essentially the de facto
situation with many unequal-earner same-sex partners who pool income. 96
The Service usually turns a blind eye to these arrangements, rarely requiring
the low-earning partner who assumes more responsibility for household
chores to report as compensation income received from the primary wageearner, even where technically it would not fall under the Duberstein
"detached and disinterested generosity" test. This was also the manner in
which the Service treated married couples in noncommunity property states
97
prior to 1948.
One way of construing this quasi-separate filer system is by viewing both
spouses' contributions-the low- or non-earner's household labor and the
primary earner's income production-as pure reciprocal gifts rather than
98
bargained-for exchanges. According to this theory, the altruistic househusband would continue mopping the floor even if his career-wife stopped

96. In some instances-when the high-earner provides over fifty percent of the lowearner's support, the partners live together, and the low earner's income falls below a certain
threshold amount-the high earner may claim the low-earner as a dependant. I.R.C. § 152
(2000).
97. The Lucas opinion, for example, framed the issue as whether the income earner, Guy
Earl, would be required to report as income his full salary as opposed to declaring only half of it
on his own return and including the other half on his wife Ella's. The court did not entertain
the possibility of requiring Guy to report one hundred percent of his income and Ella to report
again some portion of the same income attributable to payments from husband to wife for her
domestic labor or companionship. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 113-14 (1930).
98. As gifts they would therefore be exempt from income taxation. See supra text
accompanying notes 20-21.
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sharing her income with him and the wife would continue sharing her
income even if the husband refused to clean the house.
This interpretation does not sit well with the partnership ideal of
marriage to which we as a culture aspire. It also weakens non-earner spouses
by implying that nobody owes anybody anything. 99 This is not how most
people view marriage. We are uncomfortable thinking of stay-at-home
husbands and wives as beneficiaries of their spouses' bounty, of their interest
in the wage earners' incomes as dependent on something as uncertain and
optional as his or her disinterested generosity. Similarly, we think of nonearners' contributions not merely as something they do out of the goodness
of their hearts, but rather as a critical piece of couples' cooperative life
plans. Marriage is often regarded as a contract, the terms of which are the
subject of an ongoing process negotiation-not entirely at arm's length but
not entirely with one hundred percent unity of interest either.
Another way of making sense of the quasi-separate filing approach is to
regard non-earner spouses' household and childcare labor as "imputed
•
" 100 G eneraIIy, Impute
.
d mcome
.
c
.
mcome.
re~ers
to goo d s or services
prod uce d

by and for the taxpayer herself. Imputed income should be part of the tax
base because it represents an increase in taxpayers' net worth. For example,
the single taxpayer is better off when she mops her own house rather than
paying a housekeeper out of after-tax dollars. The current tax system,
however, disregards this increase by excluding imputed income from the tax
101
base. In the case of married taxpayers, when a wife mops the house that
belongs to her and her wage-earning husband, strictly speaking, only half of
her labor is imputed income; the other half is services performed for
someone else (either as a gift or a quid pro quo service). But under the
quasi-separate filing approach, a wife's household labor may be considered
"by and for" both spouses. That is, they may be considered one unit with
respect to her non-wage labor, but two units with respect to his wage labor,
on which he pays taxes separately (transfers from husband to wife would
again be construed as nontaxable gifts).
This asymmetrical imputed income/gift interpretation is even more
jarring than the reciprocal gifts interpretation. If a wife's household labor is
by and for the marital unit, a husband's wage labor should be construed with
the same unitary approach.

99. See Hasday, supra note 93, at 517 ("[L]egal efforts to mark the specialness of intimate
relationships by limiting or prohibiting economic exchange within them appear to have
systematically adverse distributional consequences for women and poorer people, maintaining
and increasing distributive inequality.").
100. See MICHAEL j. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 125 (5th ed. 2005) ("Domestic services rendered by homemakers to
their families is [sic] the largest source of imputed income from seiVices.").
101. For a discussion of the reasons for the exclusion of imputed income from the tax base,
see BITIKER & LOKKEN, supra note 21, 'll 5.3.
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3. The True Explanation for Income Splitting:
Spouses Laboring by and for the Marital Unit
This brings us to the most compelling and internally consistent
justification-or,' to be precise,· the true cultural explanation-for income
splitting. When husbands and wives share income, we are most comfortable
viewing each spouse's efforts as "by and for" the marital unit. The nonearner
cleans the family house for both spouses and the earner works outside of the
home for the family unit. Their sharing is not detached and disinterested,
but it is also not a marketplace exchange of cash for services. Income
splitting avoids the commodification problem because each spouse is
assumed to have earned fifty percent of the income of the couple regardless
of the nominal distribution of wage- and non-wage-income; unlike quasiseparate filing, income splitting comports with a narrative of marital
cooperation and unity that appeals to us culturally. 102
Note that there is a subtle difference between this theory and the
collective efforts justification discussed in Part II above. Under the collective
efforts justification, a portion of the earner husband's paycheck belongs to
his wife because by taking care of his personal needs, she has made it
possible for him to earn more. Under the "by and for the couple"
justification, the earner's check belongs to both spouses because the earner
is both spouses. 103 This is of course a fiction, but no less so than a
characterization of marital sharing as reciprocal gift giving or a
compensation arrangement.
To sum up, spouses-only income splitting can be viewed as the price we
are willing to pay to live in a society in which husbands and wives do not
have to keep accounts of what passes between them and in which each
spouse's labor is regarded as "by and for" the couple. Income splitting is the
mechanism
through
which
we
enable
and
preserve
the
104
noncommodification of labor and love within the marital unit, matching
102. See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 36, at 81-85.
103. The "by and for the couple" justification is, however, in harmony with what scholars
have seen as a set of background cultural assumptions reinforcing the formal justifications for
marriage-based distinctions. See, e.g., Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal Tax Policy,
101 W.VA. L. REv. 129, 161 (1998). Knauer observes:
The marital provisions are based on a series of assumptions concerning the terms,
merit, and nature of the taxpayer's relationship with his or her spouse. These
provisions use marital status to identity (i) a relationship where income or resource
pooling occurs (or should occur), (ii) a relationship that is worthy of societal
support in the form of tax deferral or other relief, and (iii) a relationship where
the individuals never deal with one another at arm's length.
/d.
104. Note that the context in which this Article discusses "noncommodification"-referring
solely to intramarital transfers-should be distinguished from the noncommodification of
household labor when viewed from outside the marital unit, which commentators like Staudt
and Silbaugh persuasively argue results in undervaluation of women's work. See generally
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the tax treatment of marriage to society's idealized notion of what marriage
should be. Income splitting is incompatible with an accessions-based
105
definition of income because it effectively treats gifts and compensation
for personal services as if they were compensation for business-related
services. But from a cultural perspective, income splitting recognizes an
106
ideal that is critically important to us.
The social values that undergird the income-splitting joint return,
however, are inconsistent with its extension to economically separate
spouses and with its exclusion of unmarried couples that share their income.
B.

PRACTICAL lMPLICA TIONS OF THE "BY AND FOR THE UNIT"jUSTIFICA TION:
MARRIAGE NEUTRAL ECONOMIC UNITY-BASED INCOME SPLITTING

1.

Excluding Economically Separate Spouses

The by-and-for-the-couple justification only makes sense with respect to
couples that do not themselves commodify exchanges within their
relationship, i.e., couples that do in fact earn and own 107 their income as a
unit. Mter all, if the government is going to award hundreds, sometimes
thousands of dollars in benefits so that couples can form a certain type of
union, it is only fair that these benefits be limited to couples who do in fact
form this special union. Husbands and wives who lead independent financial
lives do not fit this model; they are separate economic units and should be
treated as such.
Also, spouses committed to sharing only part of their earnings should
not be eligible to income split, nor should they be allowed, as Henry Smith
has suggested, to partially split their taxable income on the basis of an

Silbaugh, supra note 95; Staudt, supra note 51. Indeed, taken to its logical conclusion, the
noncommodification element of my proposed justification for income splitting elevates the
value of non-wage labor within the marriage. By paying couples a marriage bonus for forming
one economic unit, income splitting based on income sharing implies an equivalence in the
value of spouses' labor.
105. See supra note I3 and accompanying text.
106. Income splitting may also be popular for economic reasons, because many believe that
marriage functions as a giant buddy system, a national insurance policy of sorts that reduces the
likelihood that the government will be called upon to provide social services to the needy. See,
e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003) (noting that civil
marriage "ensures that children and adults are cared for and supported whenever possible from
private rather than public funds"). Note, however, that commentators like Martha Fineman
believe that government should not shift its responsibility to provide a social safety net onto
private individuals. Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, in JUST MARRIAGE 46, 47 (Mary
Lyndon Shanley ed., 2004). See generally Duggan, supra note 7.
107. Though fine distinctions may be made berween couples that "share" versus those that
"pool" their income, these distinctions are not dispositive for the purposes of this Article. What
matters, as I discuss in Part IV.A., is that the couple shares legal entitlement to the income as
they do in the community property model. Thus "sharing" and "pooling" are used
interchangeably to refer to joint ownership over income.
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108

individually determined unequal sharing ratio.
This is because the very
reason we allow income splitting, which represents a radical deviation from
the logic of the assignment of income doctrine, is because we recognize that
there is something fundamentally special about two people who have tied
their financial fates to one another that makes it artificial and potentially
harmful to force transfers between them into categories applicable to truly
independent taxpayers. In these cases, analyzing intra-marital transfers using
tools applicable to unrelated parties makes no sense. Indeed, referring to
sharing between spouses who co-own each other's income from its very
inception as a "transfer" is misleading. They are simply one person; the
notion of exchange, the attempt to allocate "transfers" into
gift/ compensation categories, is antithetical to the nature of their
relationship. By contrast, spouses who share some but not all of their income
have already introduced marketplace principles of exchange into their
relationship. Indeed, Smith's intermediate joint filing would give social
legitimacy to unequal partnerships, potentially weakening already powerless
low- and non-earner spouses. 109 Unequal partnerships do not constitute one
economic being; therefore, there is no reason to exempt them from
allocating transfers for tax purposes among the three categories. Income
splitting persists because we believe that equality within couples is special.
Spouses who choose inequality-for whatever reason-should be regarded

108.
109.

See Smith, supra note 44, at 146.
Frantz and Dagan state:

People may engage in many joint enterprises where equality is not necessary. Joint
owners in a business, for instance, may divide the ownership interest 70-30 without
raising any alarm. But it would be peiVerse to conceive of a marriage of this sort,
where one spouse has a recognized controlling interest in the property that
partially constitutes the marriage, and, correspondingly, in marital decisions ....
Disparity in the control of marital property moves beyond simple inequalitywhich an individual may rightly choose as a means to other ends--to
subordination, which systematically denies the importance of whatever ends that
individual chooses. As subordination in marriage is a threat to a spouse's basic
personhood, the marital community must be bounded by a commitment to
equality.
See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 36, at 91 (citations omitted). In addition:

Any contract reflects the power positions of the parties. In most instances men are
more powerful than women because men are more likely to control economic
wealth. Thus, most contracts between husbands and wives will be unfavorable to
the wife. \Vhile courts could supervise all contracts between husbands and wives for
fairness, cost barriers to litigation block access to the courts in most cases. The best
the courts can do is refuse to enforce all of these contracts affecting ongoing
relationships. In most instances, this will avoid adding judicial power to that which
husbands have as a result of their economic position.
!d. (citing sources omitted); see also 1 STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION
253 (1995).
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as having opted out of the special privilege that comes with a commitment to
equality.
2.

Including Unmarried Couples Who Share Their Income

Once one accepts the principle that marriage-based income splitting
should be limited to income-sharing spouses, the question arises: why
continue to exclude income-sharing unmarried couples? The answer
depends on our cultural attitude towards unmarried unions. Though the
current state of these attitudes is the subject of much speculation, several
factors lean in favor of extending income splitting to unmarried income
sharers.
First, the noncommodification argument applies equally well to incomesharing married and unmarried couples alike, regardless of whether they are
110
composed of same- or opposite-sex partners.
Second, if applied strictly,
the current separate-filing requirement applied to unmarried couples who
pool their income conflicts with most people's understanding of the nature
of these transfers as neither pure gift nor compensation. Most importantly,
though a significant number of Americans remain opposed to government
recognition of gay marriage, there is a clear trend in favor of extending
marriage-based benefits to unmarried couples who formalize their
commitments in other ways, including through civil union or domestic
.
. . Ill
partnersh 1p reg1stnes.
IV. A NEW "I Do": ECONOMIC UNITY-BASED INCOME SPLITIING
A.

PROPOSAL CORE FEATURES

The problem before us, again, is that the marriage-based criterion for
income splitting is both over- and under-inclusive; it embraces economically
separate marrieds and excludes unmarrieds who pool their income. The
challenge then is to devise a system that makes income splitting for tax
purposes contingent on a legally binding commitment to share income
equally. In other words, the current marriage-based criterion for income
splitting must be expanded and contracted: expanded to include unmarried
income poolers and contracted to exclude economically separate marrieds.
I propose that Congress unbundle the presumption of economic unity
for income tax purposes from the institution of marriage by devising a new
criterion for income splitting. Taxpayers would be permitted to file jointly if
and only if they obligate to share equal legal entitlement to all taxable

110. Patricia Cain has demonstrated, focusing on gay couples in particular, that when
forced to file as separate individuals, unmarried gay partners face the same administrative and
psychic burdens allocating transfers amongst themselves as married couples do. See Cain, supra
note 20, at 114.
111. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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income. 112 Couples who wish to file jointly would be required to attach an
affidavit to their return attesting that they have entered into such a
commitment, whether by virtue of being married in a state that requires
equal spousal income sharing, 113 through a domestic partnership
114
registration where income sharing is an integral part of such registration,
.
115
or b y pnvate contract.

112.

Kornhauser flags this alternative, but does not explore it in detail. See Kornhauser,

supra note 5, at 72-73.

113. This would include income from separate property. Under current laws, the only states
that fall into this category are Idaho, Louisiana, Texas, and Wisconsin. See IRS Manual, supra
note 40, Exhibit 25.18.1-1, Comparison of State Law Differences in Community Property States.
114. Like most states' default marriage laws, most domestic partnership registries do not
require income sharing. Rather, they incorporate commitments similar to the marital duty of
mutual support, e.g., to "share basic living expenses," "share the common necessities and tasks
of one household," and be "responsible for each other's welfare," or to be "jointly responsible
for basic living expenses." CITY AND COUNTY OF S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, STATE AND LOCAL
DOMESTIC
PARTNERSHIP
REGISTRIES,
http:/ /sfprospector.com/site/sfhumanrights_
page.asp?id;6283. California's "Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act," on the other
hand, requires that registered domestic partners take on the duties and obligations of marriage,
which, in California, means income sharing as per the community property model (though for
state income tax purposes a domestic partner's earned income may not be treated as
community property). See CAL. FAM. CODE§ 297.5(a) & (g) (West 2004).
115. In most states couples unable or unwilling to legally unite their finances through
marriage, domestic partnership, civil union, or other marriage alternative are able to do so
through private contract, just as Guy and Ella Earl did more than a century ago. See IHARA ET
AL., supra note 85, at 2/9-10; 1 MACAULAY ET AL., supra note 109, at 275. Ihara, Warner, and
Hertz note:
[T] he courts of nearly every state and the District of Columbia now enforce written
contracts between unmarried partners. . . . [However,] Illinois remains an
exception to the general acceptance of contract rights for unmarried couples.
There the courts still hold that the "immoral" nature of living together prevents a
couple from forming a contract. (Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E. 2d 1204 (1979).)
However, some progress has been made. Most Illinois courts have carefully
suggested that contracts not based entirely on living together, and not resembling
marriage claims, may be enforced. (Spafford v. Coats, 118 III. App. 3d 566 (1983).)
This is not true of all Illinois courts, however. (See Ayala v. Fox, 564 N.E. 2d 920
(1990) [)].
IHARA ET AL., supra note 85, at 2/9-10. Note, however, that§ 20-45.3 of the Code of Virginia
prohibits any "civil union, partnership contract or other arrangement between persons of the
same sex purporting to bestow the privileges or obligations of marriage." Though it has yet to
be challenged, several commentators, including former Virginia governor Mark Warner, believe
that the provision is unconstitutional. See Press Release, Governor Mark Warner Announces His
Action on HB 751, available at http:/ /www.equalityvirginia.org/atf/cf/{F56F0407-AD15-456F9A9E-EB9BC57B69AC}/Gov_Warner_press_release_on_HB_751.doc. Governor Warner stated:
Article 1 Section 10 of the United States Constitution prohibits any state from
impairing the obligations of existing contracts. The sweeping language of HB 751
plainly violates that constitutional provision by seeking to void existing contractual
rights. Furthermore, HB 751 would appear to violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the U.S. Constitution by prohibiting. certain contracts between two people of the
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Legal Entitlements-Based Measure oflncome Sharing

In a perfect world, income splitting would be available only to couples
who jointly own all their income and behave accordingly-functioning as
equal decision makers, sharing control, and benefiting equally from their
joint income. But as we have seen, behavior is extremely difficult to gauge,
and requiring the Service to evaluate how any two people distribute burdens
and privileges amongst themselves would be both unacceptably invasive and
administratively impracticable. Recognizing the subjective and unverifiable
nature of these determinations and seeing that legal entitlements are
relatively easy to verify, tax law in many instances applies a rule that tax
liability follows legal entitlement to income. 116 In other words, it taxes
same sex (regardless of their sexual orientation) while permitting the exact same
contracts between men and women.
!d.
Additional
commentaries
on
the
proVIsiOn
may
be
accessed
at
http:/ /www.equalityvirginia.org/site/pp.asp?c=dfliiTMIG&b=181005. A state constitutional
amendment that would deny legal recognition to unmarried couples will be the subject of a
referendum in the fall of 2006.
116. Generally, the mere right or option to enter into a transaction has no tax
consequences unless and until the transaction has actually taken place (i.e., unless legal title is
actually transferred). Under certain circumstances, however, the Internal Revenue Service has
ruled that "economic compulsion" may factor into its determination as to whether a taxable
event has occurred. The economic-£ompulsion standard requires a showing that no other
course of action would be economically rational. The mere expectation that a transaction will
occur, a pattern of behavior, or the intent to follow through with a transaction does not rise to
the level of economic compulsion. See Rev. Rul. 03-97, 2003-2 C.B. 380; Rev. Rul. 03-7, 2003-1
C.B. 363 (holding that, despite shareholder's intent and likelihood to use shares already under
shareholder's control to satisfy a commitment to deliver shares or their cash equivalent at a
future date, no sale occurred until actual delivery). Revenue Ruling 03-7, relying in part on
Richardson v. Commissioner, 121 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 684 (1941), noted
that:

Despite the taxpayer's intent to use the purchased stock to close his earliest open
short sale, and despite a showing that he followed a consistent practice of applying
purchases to close out his earliest open short sale, the taxpayer was held not to
have closed a short sale because the stock was not actually delivered to the stock
lender. ... Thus, Richardson supports the conclusion that even if the shareholder
intends to complete a sale by delivering identified stock, that intent alone does not
cause a transaction to be deemed a sale, as long as the taxpayer retains the right to
determine whether the identified stock will in fact be delivered.
Rev. Rul. 03-7, 2003-1 C.B. 363.
Another context in which formal legal title may be disregarded for tax purposes is in
situations to which the "step transaction" doctrine may apply. The doctrine "treats a series of
formally separate 'steps' as a single transaction if such steps are in substance integrated,
interdependent, and focused toward a particular result." Penrod v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 1415, 1428
(1987). Three tests have developed for determining whether separate transactions will be
viewed as one: the "binding commitment" test, the "mutual interdependence" test, and the
"end result" test. See BORIS I. BITIKER & jAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS '1[12.61 (3] {7th ed. 2000).
The ample evidence of married couples who do not share income clearly
demonstrates that marriage alone does not economically compel spousal sharing. As we have
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people based on their rights to income even when, as a practical matter, they
may be unlikely to exercise these rights. Accordingly, for our purposes,
economic unity must be measured in terms of legal entitlements, not
statistical likelihood of sharing behavior.
Separate filing proponents like Kornhauser and Zelenak, who argue
persuasively that legal entitlements matter less than cultural stereotypes and
the raw power that comes with earner status, are not likely to be satisfied
with this approach. 117 But given a choice between marriage-based income

seen, marriage also does not constitute a binding commitment to pool and share income.
Finally, the existence of economically separate spouses indicates that matrimony and economic
union are not mutually interdependent steps such that one would be fruitless without the other,
and the intended or expected end result of wedlock is not necessarily economic unity.
As Kornhauser has noted:
Thorson states that historically, coordinating the tax unit with the legal property
unit was of great importance. For example, the family was the tax unit under the
Civil War income tax statutes, because under property law, the husband
substantially owned both his wife's and children's income . . . . By the time the
income tax was instituted under the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, married
women's property rights had been established, which necessitated considering the
individual as the taxable unit. The "deep commitment" to this approach is evident
in the Supreme Court's 1930 rulings in Lucas v. Earl ... and Poe v. Seaborn.
Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 96 n.103 (citing Douglas Thorson, An Analysis of the Sources of
Continued Controversy over the Tax Treatment of Family Income, 18 NAT'L TAX]. 113, 115 (1965)); see
also supra note 30.
This argument is related to, but at bottom is quite different from Zelenak's argument
for a control-, rather than consumption-based, measure of ability to pay. Zelenak's control is in
the end also a behavioral measure; it is based on an earner's control over whether she will earn
the income and on her decision to stay in the marriage, rather than the legal measure of who
actually owns the income once it has been earned. See Zelenak, supra note 5, at 354-55.
117. See generally Kornhauser, supra note 5. Zelenak believes that taxes should be based on
control of income, and he assumes that control over earned income resides entirely with the
earner, regardless of whether legal ownership over this income is shared with another. See
Zelenak, supra note 5, at 380 ("Under an income tax (as opposed to a consumption tax) income
should be taxed to the person with the closest connection to its source, and that person is
always the earner, regardless of contractual assignments or marital property regimes. Under this
analysis, income splitting is not appropriate regardless of legal ownership of earned income."
(citations omitted)). Zelenakjustifies this assumption by explaining that "[e]arners always have
a closer connection to their earnings than anyone else can possibly have. They always have
ultimate control, because they can always determine whether or how much to work." !d. at 357.
These two statements contain an unsubstantiated leap. While it is reasonable to assume that
earners have more control over their earnings than others, this does not mean that "[t]hey
always have ultimate control." !d. (emphasis added). The operative question, assuming control is
the proper guide for tax liability, is whether an earner who is legally committed to sharing her
income with a spouse controls this income so much more than her spouse so as to justifY taxing
her and only her on the income. Assume the earner exercises seventy percent control over the
income-she can decide whether and how much to work, and her earning power gives her
additional decision-making clout regarding how earnings will be spent (even though legally her
spouse is an equal co-owner). Still, income splitting, which presumes a fifty-fifty control
structure, would more truthfully represent reality than would a single filer approach (which
presumes a one hundred to zero breakdown). For Zelenak to be right, earners who are legally
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splitting-which requires neither legal nor behavioral equality-and my
proposal-which at least demands equal legal entitlements-even firm
separate-filing believers should recognize the latter as a lesser evil.
2.

Rates, Bonuses, and Penalties

Recognizing that income splitting bestows a special benefit that violates
assignment of income principles, the rate brackets applicable to incomepooling couples would be set so as to reflect public assessment of the relative
social value of allowing committed couples to treat each member's labor as
"by and for" the couple. Most likely, the new schedule would resemble the
current married-filingjointly schedule so as not to reduce present marriage
bonuses for spouses who formalize income-sharing arrangements.
Couples for whom filing jointly would be disadvantageous (e.g., equal
earners) would be able to file separately, using the same rates as those
applicable to individual filers (i.e., there would be no special structure as
there is today for married individuals filing separately). Thus, there would
be no "penalty." Since couples neutrality is no longer the conceptual hook
supporting income splitting, this solution to the current marriage penalty
does not run into the conceptual pitfalls of previous proposals to allow
optional separate filing for married taxpayers. Couples neutrality dictates
that a husband and wife making $50,000 each should pay the same taxes as a
one-earner couple making $100,000 because their combined income is the
same. As Zelenak put it, "The purpose of joint filing is to impose equal tax
on equal income couples, and optional joint filing defeats that purpose." 118
The by-and-for-the-couple explanation says that income splitting should be
extended to the one-earner couple not because it is economically equivalent
to the equal earners (as we have seen, it is not), but because we are
uncomfortable applying the assignment of income doctrine to egalitarian
partnerships or treating intra-couple transfers as detached and disinterested
gifts; the mechanism through which we match tax treatment with our byand-for-the-couple ideal is income splitting. Thus, income-sharing oneobligated to share their income would have to exercise more than seventy-five percent control
over their earnings. Whether this is in fact the case is anybody's guess. Zelenak recognizes the
futility of investigations into the power dynamics within couples. Zelenak, supra note 5, at 357
("The basic [income tax] principles are very simple. Earned income is taxed to the earner, and
property income is taxed to the owner. The law normally looks no further into questions of
power than that, and reasonably so."). However, he insists that an earner has total control over
his earnings, even if he is obligated to share it with his wife. Id. at 382. See also Jones, supra note
34, at 269 (referring to community property interests of nonearner wives as "'a right without a
remedy'" (quoting Revenue Revision of 1942: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 77th
Cong. 1475 (1942) (briefofBurnite [sic] Shelton Matthews, Chairman of the Lawyers Council,
National Woman's Party)); McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1010 ("Equality of de jure treatment
comes at the price of inequality of de facto effect. And, we are not being neutral in regard to
different models of the family: we are exalting single-earner households over all competing
visions.").
ll8. Zelenak, supra note 6, at 18.

91 IOWALAWREVIEW

1548

[2006]

earners get a benefit compared with financially independent couples and
compared with singles making the same amount, but they need not be put
in the same position as the equal earners with the same combined income.
As a result the couple earning $50,000 each will pay less in taxes than the
119
$100,000 one-earner couple.
3.

Related Taxpayers

Related taxpayers (excluding spouses) would not be permitted to file
jointly because the cultural underpinnings of income splitting are rooted in
a partnership ideal of marriage or marriage-like relationships. Also, allowing
family members to file jointly would erode one of the central objectives of
12
the estate tax. ° Finally, the limitation on related joint filers represents an
.tmportant ann-a
. b use measure. 121
It should be noted that in most instances this limitation would be
inconsequential because relatives do not generally share income equally.
Rather, more frequently, one relative supports another with less than fifty
percent of her income, and this support should be accounted for through
dependency exemptions, not income splitting, which is grounded in a
completely different rationale, .namely an assumption that both taxpayers
own and control all income equally. For this reason, the proposal would
eliminate the "head of household" category, replacing it with more generous
.
122
d epend ency exemptions.
119. Cf id. at 13-17 (discussing politically unpopular distributional effects of previous
optional separate filing proposals).
120. According to Dukeminier and Johanson, such central objective is preventing the
perpetuation oflarge concentrations of wealth:
With the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration ... [t)he leveling of great inherited
fortunes was formally accepted as an object of the estate tax. In a message to
Congress, President Roosevelt declared: "The desire to provide security for one's
self and one's family is natural and wholesome, but it is adequately served by a
reasonable inheritance. Great accumulations of wealth cannot be justified on the
basis of personal and family security. In the last analysis such accumulations
amount to the perpetuation of great and undesirable concentration of control in a
relatively few individuals over the employment and welfare of many, many
others . . . . [I)nherited economic power is as inconsistent with the ideals of this
generation as inherited political power was inconsistent with the ideals of the
generation which established our government."
See JESSE DUKEM1NIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 992 (2005)

(quoting H.R. REP. No. 74-1681, at 2 (1935)).
121. Tax law is often suspicious of related-party transactions. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 267 (2000)
(disallowing a deduction for losses from sales or exchanges between related parties).
122. Because the proper justification for income splitting was not previously articulated,
Congress has failed to distinguish the logic behind income splitting from the logic justifYing
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4.

Friends

Though the by-and-for-the-couple framework is generally associated
with romantic partnerships, in some instances, especially among the
123
elderly, platonic friendships evolve into income-sharing partnerships. This
is not the type of partnership for which, as a cultural matter, the incomesplitting joint return exists. Nevertheless, such pairs would be permitted to
file jointly as long as they undertook the income-sharing commitments
outlined above. This compromise is necessary to avoid the obvious privacy
and line-drawing concerns that would arise were we to devise a standard for
determining whether a given relationship is romantic. As a policy matter,
extending the benefits of joint filing to the rare income-sharing friendship is
not particularly troublesome as these relationships contribute to the
common good in many of the same ways as marriage and other intimate
. 124
partners h tps.

support exemptions on two important occasions. First, in 1951, the House Ways and Means
Committee report explained the rationale behind the head of household category as follows:
It is believed that taxpayers, not having spouses but nevertheless required to
maintain a household for the benefit of other individuals, are in a somewhat
similar position to married couples who, because they may share their income, are
treated under present law substantially as if they were two single individuals each
with half of the total income of the couple. The income of a head of household
who must maintain a home for a child, for example, is likely to be shared with the
child to the extent necessary to maintain the home, and raise and educate the
child. This, it is believed, justifies the extension of some of the benefits of income
splitting.
H.R. REP. No. 82-586, at 11 (1951). Again Congress's 1969 decision to extend income splitting
to surviving spouses with dependents was explained in reference to support obligations. See
Ventry, supra note 10, at 313 ("On extending full income splitting to surviving spouses with
dependents, the staffs [of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation and the
Committee on Finance] explained that the House felt these individuals maintained 'full
obligations of a married couple toward their children after their spouses die.'" (quoting STAFFS
OF THE jOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION AND THE COMM. ON FIN., 91ST CONG.,
SUMMARY OF H.R. 13270, THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 103 (Comm. Print 1969))); see also
Cain, supra note 20, at 101, 120, 123.
123. See jane Gross, Older Women Team up to Face Future Together, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004, at
AI.
124. See supra text accompanying note 93.
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Enforcement, Dissolution, and Anti-Abuse Measures

Just as the current system relies on state law to establish marital status, 125
so under the economic-unity proposal the SeiVice would not be responsible
for enforcing the legal entitlements that fulfill the eligibility criterion for
joint filing. Rather, the obligations of unmarried joint filers would be
126
enforced under extstmg state contract law principles,
and the
enforcement of spousal rights and obligations would be addressed according
to local family law. 127 Should a union that qualifies for joint filing dissolve,
the division of assets would likewise be handled under state contract or

125. See Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60 ("The marital status of individuals as determined
under state law is recognized in the administration of the Federal income taX laws."). Note,
however, that the Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) defines marriage for federal
purposes as a legal union between one man and one woman. Therefore, for federal income taX
purposes, a same-sex couple married in Massachusetts may not file a joint return. IRS
Publication 17, at 23, available at http:/ /www.irs.gov/publications/pl7 (last visited Feb. 4,
2006). Scholars and practitioners are currently engaged in a heated debate over whether
California domestic partners-whose unions are governed by the same community property
rules applicable to married couples in that state-should be permitted to income split as per Poe
v. Seaborn. See Patricia A. Cain, &litigating Seaborn: Taxing the Community Income of California
Registered Domestic Partners (University of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05-39, 2006),
available at http:/ /ssrn.com/abstract=881763. In a nonbinding memorandum, the Internal
Revenue Service recently advised that the Poe decision "does not extend to registered domestic
partners." I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 200608038 (Feb. 24, 2006). Since the economic-unity
proposal is marriage neutral, this problem would be solved. For a response to the
Memorandum, see generally Dennis]. Ventry, Jr., No Income Splitting for Domestic Partners: How
the IRS Erred, llO TAX NOTES 1221 (2005).
126. See generally Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (holding that in California,
disputes between unmarried partners must be determined based on contract law principles).
The Marvin rule has been widely adopted in other states. Note however that it no longer applies
to California unmarried couples who have registered domestic partnerships. These couples are
governed by the same regime applicable to married couples. 1 MACAULAY ET AL., supra note
109, at 274; see also IHARA ET AL., supra note 85, at 2/9.
127. This would likely produce some variation from state to state. From a taX perspective,
the result would not be perfectly uniform, though it would guarantee a much closer match
between taX treatment and legal entitlement to income than under the present system. As a
constitutional matter, this lack of uniformity would not be troublesome; the Supreme Court has
interpreted Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution-requiring that "all Duties, Imports and
excises shall be uniform throughout the United States"-as requiring "geographic" uniformity
rather than "intrinsic" uniformity. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 92-93 (1900). In other
words, as long as a federal plan "operate[s] generally throughout the United States," lack of
uniformity resulting from differences in state property laws does not present constitutional
problems. See id. at 96; see also Pahl v. Comm'r, 150 F.3d 1124, ll28 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Courts
look to the tax statutes and interpreting cases to determine what interest is sufficient to trigger
tax liability, and to state law to determine whether the taXpayer had such an interest."); Ballard
v. United States, 17 F.3d ll6, ll8 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Although federal law defines partnerships
for purposes of applying the partnership income taXation scheme . . . it is state law that
determines when a partner is liable for the obligations-including employment taXes-of his
partnership." (citation omitted)); United States v. Hays, 877 F.2d 843, 844 n.3 (lOth Cir. 1989)
("[C]ourts have assumed that the liability of a general partner for the taX obligations of the
partnership is determined by state law rather than federal law.").
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family law. Property settlements, alimony, and child support would receive
the same income tax treatment as under the current system, and this
treatment would be extended to the dissolution of other partnerships that
qualified for joint filing.
There is a risk that taxpayers will enter into fraudulent agreements so as
to gain access to the tax savings of joint filing without taking on the
attendant income-sharing obligations. For example, income earners and
non-earners could file jointly, agreeing to split the tax benefit but not the
underlying income. For this reason, joint filing would not be available to
family members, other than spouses. Also, the new regime would be
governed by civil and criminal penalties applicable to fraudulent filers under
the current system. 128 Finally, the heart of the proposed system-equal
entitlement to all taxable income-itself serves as a deterrent to cheaters.
The non-earner could always renege on her promise and demand more
than the agreed-upon "fee" for her signature. The earner would then face a
choice between criminal penalties and honoring the joint filing
commitment-i.e., ceding fifty percent of her income for the year or years in
question to the threatening co-party to the scam.
6.

Limitation to Pairs

As a matter of tax policy, there is no reason to limit the economic unity
option to pairs. Polygamous families, collectives, and three or more
housemates who obligate to pool and equally share all income should,
theoretically speaking, be treated accordingly for tax purposes. As a political
matter, however, although societal acceptance of non-marital two-member
partnerships has increased dramatically, other partnerships have not
received social sanction. Thus, the economic unity proposal stands a better
chance of becoming a reality if it is limited to pairs.
7.

Effect on Other Provisions

In addition to affecting the rate schedules in section 1 of the Internal
Revenue Code, other sections relating to marital status, like section 267which denies deductions for losses on sales between related persons-and
section 1041-which provides for nonrecognition of transfers between
spouses-would be changed to apply to economically united taxpayers
regardless of their marital status. 129

128. See I.R.C. §§ 6663, 7206 (2000).
129. Other I.R.C. sections, the application of which relies on marital status, include section
68 (concerning the limitation on itemized deductions), section 163(h)(3)(B) (concerning the
home mortgage interest deduction), section 179 (allowing taxpayers to expense certain capital
expenditures), section 221 (providing for student loan interest deduction), section 21
(household and dependent care credit), and section 32 (providing the earned income tax
credit). These provisions currently create an advantage for unmarried couples. For a discussion
of these provisions and their implications for the gay marriage debate, see Theodore P. Seto,
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Effect on Case Law

In terms of the case law, the proposal calls for a legislative override of
Lucas v. Earf3° --income-sharing contracts would no longer be irrelevant for
131
tax purposes-and a limitation on the principle of Poe v. Seabom -spouses
in community-property states would still be eligible to income split but only
so long as they have not contracted out of spousal sharing requirements.
The proposal would also override the pre-1948 cases that struggled with the
conceptual contradiction that resulted from the combination of Lucas and
n
132
roe.
9.

Gift and Estate Tax Implications

The proposal's gift and estate tax implications are outside the scope of
this Article, but assuming that the general structure of gift and estate taxes
remains constant, acceptance of the equality requirement vis-a-vis income
splitting would imply that a similar principle should govern the gift and
estate tax context. Currently, many federal gift and estate tax provisions treat
133
married taxpayers as merged economic units. For reasons similar to those
applicable to income splitting, gift and estate tax provisions treating married
taxpayers as units should theoretically be modified so as to apply only to
taxpayers who, like Mr. and Mrs. Earl, legally share all of their assets during
their lives together regardless of their marital status. 134
B.

POIJCY lMPIJCA TIONS

Equality-based income splitting would eliminate the discriminatory
effects of the marriage bonus-the exclusion of economically united couples
from the benefits of income splitting and the free ride now extended to
economically uncommitted high-earners who happen to be married. It
would also diminish the innocent-spouse problem: Couples filing jointly

The Assumption of Selfzshness in the Internal Revenue Code: Reflections on the Unintended Tax
Advantages of Gay Marriage 18-19 (Loyola Law School Los Angeles, Legal Studies Paper No.
2005-33, 2005), available at http:/ /papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=850645.
130. 281 u.s. 111 (1930).
131. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
132. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44,49-57 (1944) (Douglas,]., dissenting).
133. See I.R.C. § 2056 (2000) (providing for a marital deduction from the estate of a
decedent equal to the amount passing to a surviving spouse); Id. § 2523 (providing for a gift tax
deduction equal to the amount of inter-vivos transfers to a spouse); Id. § 2513 (treating gifts
made by one spouse to a third party as if they were made one-half by the donor spouse and onehalf by the other spouse).
134. The number of couples prepared to merge assets is likely to be much smaller than the
number of those ready to share income. A strict application of the principles of the proposal to
gift and estate taxes would therefore defeat a current public policy that many believe to be
important: encouraging spouses to gift and bequeath to each other. A possible solution might
be to extend partial gift and estate tax benefits to couples that share only income and full
benefits to those that share income as well as assets equally.
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would still bear joint and several liability for taxes owed, but now this
potential liability would come along with actual co-ownership of the income
being taxed. The marriage penalty would be erased completely because
marital status would have no income tax relevance. There would also be no
marriage (or couples) penalty because the proposal allows for optional
separate filing. For couples filing jointly, the stacking effect would remain,
but its marginalization of secondary earners would be alleviated since they
would at least have an ownership interest in their partners' wages. (It should
be noted that the proposal is consistent with a reintroduction of the twoearner deduction, which would address the stacking effect directly.)
The proposed system would also create an incentive for one-earner
couples to formally agree that the work of housewives/husbands and
135
caretakers is equal to the monetary contributions of breadwinners.
This
would likely diminish the vulnerability of dependent spouses who are
already treated as equal or close-to-equal partners. Equality-based income
splitting would not, of course, turn unequal partnerships into equal ones,
but unlike marriage-based income splitting, it would not be complicit in
perpetuating the marital-unity fairytale. Instead, it would encourage
transparency in relationships early on, exposing the common mismatch in
expectations that is a common cause of domestic strife. 136 Now, income
splitting is based on a fiction. Under my proposal, it would at least be based
on enforceable legal entitlements.
The proposal's exclusion of non-egalitarian marriages from income
splitting is consistent with the broad appeal of the partnership ideal of

135. Economic unity-based income splitting might therefore reverse what Pamela Gann
views as a negative incentive structure set up by the 1948 Act, which, she argues, solidified
separate ownership and contributed to the financial dependence of wives on their husbands. See
Gann, supra note 5, at 47; Cf Jones, supra note 34, at 273 (discussing tax law as a vehicle for
changing power between husbands and wives, and noting that "[t]he spread of communityproperty laws during the period from 1939 to 194 7 is testimony to the efficacy of the federal tax
incentive for readjustment of economic power between spouses.").
136. See ROBERT STEPHAN COHEN, RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES 101 (2002) ("(T]here is no
better time to assess financial expectations and individual spending habits than when two
people are still getting to know each other."). See generally LENORE]. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE
CONTRACT (1981) (advocating for intimate contracts in lieu of marriage); Equality in Marriage
Institute, Educating Women and Men About the Importance of Equality in Marriage and
Divorce, www.equalityinmarriage.org.
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marriage, 137 indirectly resurrecting a positive aspect of traditional marriage
without its patriarchal taint. At the same time, the proposal does not
threaten states' sovereignty over family law or freedom of contract principles
that have undergirded greater acceptance for pre- and post-marital
arrangements. 138 Unlike the pre-1948 period when federal tax law created an
incentive for states to convert to community property law, the proposal
139
leaves marriage law to the exclusive jurisdiction of the states.
Civil

137. Frantz and Dagan articulate their VISIOn of marriage as an "egalitarian liberal
community." Frantz & Dagan, supra note 36, at 125. Frantz and Dagan explain:
A regime that grants each spouse an immediate half interest in the marital estate
recognizes the special relationship between the spouses and reinforces each
spouse's sense of equal participation in the marriage. By contrast, a system of
separate property treats spouses as proprietors in their relationship with one
another, and furthermore places the non-propertied spouse in a dependent
subordinate position.
/d. (citations omitted). "Because expecting women to protect themselves against marital
subordination is both unrealistic and undesirable, the law must provide institutional guarantees
of gender equality to support marital community." /d. at 93-94; see also SUSAN MOLLER OKIN,
JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 152 ( 1989).
All states have adopted some form of equitable distribution, indicating a trend toward
an egalitarian view of marriage. See Developments, supra note 36, at 2098 (identifying "an internal
inconsistency in divorce law" produced by the "conflict between two differing conceptions of
the marital relationship: marriage as contract and marriage as partnership"). Specifically:

While judicial deference to antenuptial agreements has grown, the United States
has simultaneously experienced a trend toward equal division of marital property,
reflecting the conception of marriage as parmership and rejecting the notion of a
patriarchal relationship. The notion of equality inherent in the partnership
conception of marriage is at odds with a system in which courts refuse to review
antenuptial agreements for substantive fairness at the time of their enforcement.
/d. at 2077. The article recommends instituting a "system in which judges undertake substantive
fairness review at the time of an agreement's enforcement and presumptively invalidate
agreements failing to approximate equal division of marital property." Id. at 2098.
138. See Developments, supra note 36, at 2078 (describing a "trend in favor of enforcement
[of antenuptial agreements], more limited judicial review, and greater respect for parties'
freedom of contract"); see also Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, A Contract Theory of Marriage,
in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 201, 205 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999), quoted in
Developments, supra note 36, at 2078 n.13 ("The law's embrace of private ordering in marriage is
part of a broader policy of maximizing the freedom of individuals to pursue personal ends in
intimate relationships.").
139. A nationwide, mandatory spousal sharing requirement might backfire by discouraging
marriage among couples who, while they may not be prepared to share their income, are
prepared to take on other marital obligations-such as the presumption of paternity, the
(minimal) duty of mutual support, medical decision-making responsibilities, and monogamy. In
an age of high divorce rates and multiple marriages, moneyed fiances or fiances with
commitments to children or spouses from prior marriages may have good reasons for hesitating
before they cede ownership over future earning at the altar. And yet, economically weak
individuals, one might argue, are better off marrying their lovers even if their marriage is
governed by a premarital agreement that gives them minimal ownership rights. But see Gann,
supra note 5, at 50-51.
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marriage supplies couples with a wide range of useful default rules, many of
which do not concern property, including the presumption of paternity,
hospital access, automatic power of attorney, and decision-making power
over funeral arrangements. Under my marriage-blind proposal, couples
could continue to marry (or not) regardless of whether they share their
income, and each state's marriage laws could continue to include their own
presumptions or mandatory rules regarding property sharing during
marriage.
Nevertheless, serious consideration should be given to the risk that the
availability of equality-based income-splitting options might gradually
transform marriage by eroding spousal-sharing requirements or equalpartnership presumptions that do currently exist. For example, a married
couple's choice not to file jointly might factor into an equitable distribution
proceeding as a persuasive indication that the spouses did not view their
partnership as a fifty-fifty proposition and that neither spouse could have
reasonably relied on such an interpretation. 140 This would likely prejudice
economically weaker spouses, rolling back hard-won protections.
Counterbalancing this risk is the possibility that the new law would lead
social and religious institutions to encourage, even demand, that couples
unite their finances, thereby bolstering spousal sharing and encouraging
other egalitarian unions. For example, a given religion might declare that
marriage for purposes of that religion must be an economic partnership of
equals.
Consideration should also be given to the ongoing debate regarding the
relative merits of community-property versus separate-property regimes as
141
vehicles for advancing gender equality. Regardless of this debate, it is clear

140. Equitable distribution is generally based on judicial discretion.
141. Though mandating spousal equality and unity seems appealing at first glance, there is
a longstanding debate as to whether a community model would help women achieve everelusive equality. See HERMA HILL KAY & MARTHA S. WEST, SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION: TEXT,
CAsES, AND MATERIALS 261-74 (5th ed. 2002).
Some argue that separate property regimes are better for women because when
women and men pool their resources, men inevitably control them. Thus, even if separate
property models are likely to leave women with less in terms of formal ownership rights, total
ownership over less property is better than the semblance of ownership over more property. The
thrust of this argument informs several commentators' views of the logic behind married
women's property acts. It also inspired opposition to the trend towards adopting community
property laws on the eve of the 1948 Act. See PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN
COUPLES 109 (1983), cited in Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 90 ("In traditional marriage,
interdependence is usually achieved at the cost of the wife's autonomy and her participation on
an equal basis in decision-making."); McCAFFREY, supra note 51, at 11-48; Bittker, supra note 29,
at 1399-1414;Jones, supra note 34, at 259; Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 73-76, 102. Arps and
Rees write:
[F]eminist theory undercuts the very premise that the family is an economic unit.
The economic unit theory assumes that the family is a monolithic, homogeneous
group in which all members share the same tastes and resources, including
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that separate property-style marriage is inconsistent with income splitting.
More broadly, for reasons discussed above, the current mismatch between
internal economic unity and presumed economic unity for purposes of a
couple's relationship with the state has a slew of negative consequences. If
we are going to keep the income-splitting joint return, the only defensible
criterion for joint filing is income sharing. At the same time, efforts already
142
underway to improve community property systems should be broadened
beyond community-property states and beyond marriage to assist all couples
seeking to form equitable personal partnerships.
The proposal's introduction of income splitting to income sharing
unmarried couples is more controversial. However, once the public turns its
attention to the wide state-to-state variations in what marriage means and to
the broad freedom to contract out of all but the most minimal marital
obligations, Americans may well agree that the relationship between income
splitting and civil marriage is arbitrary. (Again, though groups that oppose
extending marriage-like benefits or protections to same-sex couples would
reject the proposal, they are in the minority. Most Americans oppose gay
marriage but support civil unions.)
All things being equal, it is not clear whether adoption of the proposal
would increase or decrease revenue. On the one hand, the proposal
expands the pool of those eligible to income split by making joint filing
available to economically united unmarrieds. On the other hand, the
proposal contracts the pool by excluding spouses who do not commit to
unite. Which group would be larger? Would newly created income-splitting
benefits amount to more in lost revenues than the rise in revenue
attributable to married taxpayers who will no longer enjoy marriage
143
bonuses?
These questions would have to be investigated in detail in
evaluating the proposal.
Finally, in addition to rationalizing the tax treatment of economically
united couples and of economically separate marrieds, the proposal would
begin to alleviate the growing confusion attributable to the proliferation of

income, equally. Under this "benign patriarch" theory of the family, the male
"head of household" traditionally speaks and acts for the unit.
Patricia F. Apps & Ray Rees, Taxation and the Household, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 355, 355 ( 1988), cited in
Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 97 (referring to GARY BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (enlarged
ed. 1991)).
On the other hand, some commentators hold fast to the ideal that marital unity and
equality are compatible. See, e.g., MCCAFFERY, supra note 51, at 36 ("Reva Siegel's historical and
legal research shows first that the married women's property acts emerging from the nineteenth
century were actually a rather conservative attempt to forestall a claim by women for equal
ownership of all marital assets ... .");Frantz & Dagan, supra note 36.
142. See KAY & WEST, supra note 141, at 269.
143. The fact that pooling is less prevalent among unequal-earners and that these earners
also receive the biggest bonuses suggests significant potential revenue gains from the exclusion
of nonsharing spouses.
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inconsistent domestic partner mandates by state and local governments 144 by
creating a clear federal standard for allocation of privileges, the rationales
for which are based on a presumption of economic unity.

V.

CONCLUSION

In his seminal 1975 article defending marriage-based income splitting,
Boris Bittker wrote: "the concept of a marital partnership is a widespread
ideal and, whether realized in fact or not, it is an appealing principle to use
in fixing the tax liability of married couples. "145 Marital partnership is indeed
an appealing principle. If it were realized in fact, and if the marriage were
open to all and only to economically united couples, marriage would
constitute a reasonable criterion for allocating income splitting privileges.
But family law in the United States falls far short of these ideals. As a result,
the current income splitting system gives a windfall to financially
uncommitted high-earners, penalizes unmarried couples, exposes low- and
non-earners to potential liability attributable to income they never owned,
and creates a marriage penalty.
Working women spend approximately twice as much time as their male
146
counterparts housekeeping and caring for children;
men spend more
47
time at their jobs and on sports and leisure/ and they continue to earn

144. See ESKRIDGE & HUi'rfER, supra note 50, at 791-94; Kelley Blassingame, Domestic Partner
Mandates Complicate Decisionmaking, EMP. BENEFIT NEWS, Mar. 2004. Bowman notes:
The legal treatment of cohabitation in the United States has been radically and
rapidly transformed during the first few years of the twenty-first century .... There
are great regional variances-from Massachusetts, where marriage [has become]
available to same-sex couples ... to Nebraska, where the state constitution was
amended in 2000 to prohibit recognition not only of same-sex marriage but also of
civil unions or domestic partnerships of any sort (Neb. Const, Art. I, § 29). Similar
variety exists as to opposite-sex cohabitants. The state of Washington grants many
of the benefits of marriage to all cohabitants, both same- and opposite-sex, while
Illinois extends no recognition at all to cohabitants, for fear that to do so would
somehow denigrate the institution of marriage.
Cynthia Grant Bowman, Legal Treatment of Cohabitation in the United States, 26 LAw & POL'Y 119,
119 (2004); id. at 146 ("The system as it now exists is clearly unstable. The various conflict oflaw
problems ... import a built-in instability, as couples who have been granted either the status or
incidents of marriage move from state to state."); Martha M. Ertman, Mamage as a Trade:
Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79, 80 (2001) ("(A] patchwork
of legal doctrines has emerged to regulate [relationships that fall outside the bounds of
conventional family law]. In various jurisdictions, nonmarital affiliations are called reciprocal
beneficiary relationships, domestic partnerships, meretricious relationships, and civil unions.
Each affiliation is defined differently and accorded different rights and duties." (citations
omitted)).
145. Bittker, supra note 29, at 1421.
146. Edmund L. Andrews, Survey Confirms It: Women Outjuggle Men, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15,
2004, at A23.
147. Jd.
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. h t percent more th an work'mg women. 148 Many marne
. d
some twenty-e•g
heterosexual couples with profiles resembling this national average conceive
of themselves as merged economic units-they share their income and the
tax system treats them accordingly. For these couples, the economic unity
proposal would create an incentive to formalize a practice of sharing already
in place, turning gratuitous spousal transfers into a legal obligation and
giving low-earning wives who perform the brunt of the couples' housework
the economic equality they deserve. More broadly, the system would also
engender societal recognition that the non-wage labor of stay-at-home
spouses and the monetary contributions of breadwinners are equally
valuable.
Married equal-earners would benefit from economic-unity-based
income splitting because the proposal would completely eliminate the
marriage penalty.
For married unequal-earners who do not share fifty-fifty, the proposal
would create an incentive to move towards egalitarian partnerships. Married
high-earners who are not prepared to share their income with their spouses
would face a tax hike which, though unpleasant, would be difficult to argue
against. This Article does not pass judgment on such taxpayers; it simply
insists that tax treatment match reality. If spouses do not share their income,
they should not be treated as if they do for tax purposes. Low-earner
spouses, meanwhile, would be free of potential liability on taxes for income
they never owned. Finally, the economic unity proposal would eliminate
marital-status discrimination from income taxes. In conclusion to his classic
article, Bittker wrote:
[T]heoreticians . . . cannot 'solve' the problem of taxing family
income. . . . They can identify the issues that must be resolved,
point out conflicts among the objectives to be served, propose
alternative approaches, and predict the outcome of picking one
route rather than another. Having performed these functions, the
expert must give way to the citizen, whose judgments in the end
rest on nothing more precise or permanent than collective social
149
pre£erences.
This Article begins with the citizen. It recognizes that attitudes towards
non-marital partnerships are in a state of unprecedented flux and that
young Americans are increasingly receptive to alternative family structures.
This Article also acknowledges that Americans are not prepared to ignore
coupledom in favor of an individual-centered approach to taxation. The
economic unity proposal accepts the income-splitting joint return as a
permanent element of our system and insists that the criterion for its
148. BUREAU OF lABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF lABOR, WOMEN'S EARNINGS 78 PERCENT
OF MEN's IN 2002, http:/ /www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2003/oct/wk2/art03.hun.
149. Bittker, supra note 29, at 1463.
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application be true to its underlying justification: taxing all economically
united couples-and only economically united couples-in a manner that
respects and supports their partnership of equals.
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VI. APPENDIX: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF INCOME SPLITTING, THE
150

MARRIAGE BONUS, AND THE MARRIAGE PENALTY

In the early days of the income tax, all taxpayers were required to file
individual (or "separate") returns and there was only one rate schedule.
Mandatory separate filing meant that a married couple with one earner
owed the same in taxes as a single person making the same amount.
However, some one-earner couples who were legally obligated to share
income equally argued that their tax liabilities should reflect their "income
splitting" economic reality.
To understand why one- and unequal-earner couples benefit from
income splitting in a system with graduated tax rates, consider the following
example. Assume that all taxable income up to $50,000 is taxed at a 10%
rate, and all income above $50,000 is taxed at a 35% rate. Now consider Uri
and Una ("U" for unequal earners). Uri earns $90,000 and Una earns
$10,000. (Men often make significantly more than women, a fact which is an
important piece of our story.) Uri's $90,000 will be taxed at two different
rates. The first $50,000 will fall into the 10% bracket, while his top $40,000
of income will be subject to the 35% rate. Una's $10,000 will be taxed at 10%
in its entirety.
Separate Filing

URI

UNA

This is their tax treatment if they are treated as separate individuals.

150. The text of this Appendix was inspired by MCCAFFERY, supra note 51, at 12-19. The
graphics were designed by Jenny Chan. I am also thankful to Jonathan Corum .and Christopher
Smith for their invaluable editorial suggestions.
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But if they are allowed to "income split," $40,000 of Uri's income will be
attributed to Una, shifting it from the 35% bracket into the 10% bracket.
Income Splitting

URI

UNA

Thus, income that was subject to the 35% rate is now subject to the 10%
rate.
Separate Filing with Income Splitting

URI

UNA

[2006]
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To calculate the value of the benefit, let us compare Uri and Una's
combined tax liability with and without the income splitting benefit.

Separate Filing

URI

URI {

UNA

=

$40,000 X 35%

= $14,000
= $1,000

tota I tax

URI

UNA

Sso,ooo x 10%
$10,000 X 10%

Separate Filing with Income Splitting

=

UNA

Ss.ooo

$zo,ooo

after tax income: $8o,ooo

URI
UNA

Sso,ooo x 10% = Ss,ooo
Sso,ooo x 10% = Ss,ooo
tota I tax = $1o,ooo
after tax income: $go,ooo

The type of income splitting described above is often referred to as
"pure income splitting," and initially, in 1930, the Supreme Court ruled that
only couples in community-property states-who were required to share
income pursuant to state property laws-would be eligible to income split in
151
this way. Couples in non-community property states, even if they signed a
private contract binding them to share as much or even more than they
would be required to under community property laws, were not permitted to
income split. 152 Thus, in 1930, Uri and Una's combined tax liability would be
$10,000 if they lived in Texas but $20,000 if they lived next door in
Oklahoma.

151.
152.

SeePoev.Seaborn,282U.S.101 (1930).
SeeLucasv. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
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In 1948, Congress extended "pure income splitting" to all married
couples, regardless of where they lived and regardless of whether they were
legally obligated to share their income. The 1948 Act did this by allowing
married couples to aggregate or "stack" their income and file a joint return.
Their combined marital income was then subject to a rate schedule
composed of brackets that were twice as large as the brackets that made up
the individual rate structure. Using our simplified example (in reality there
were more than two brackets), a 1948-style married filing jointly schedule
would tax combined I:'.arital income up to $100,000 at the 10% rate, and
income above $100,000 at 35%.
This 1948-style schedule for spouses filing jointly is the functional
equivalent of the pre-1948 income splitting system available to spouses in
community property states whereby spouses filed separately but the highearner's income was attributed to her low-earner spouse. Uri and Una would
pay the same in taxes under either system, but the calculation would be
different. Whereas before, Uri and Una split their income and then applied
the individual rate structure, now they add their income and apply the rate
structure with brackets twice as large.
Pre-1948 Separate Filing
with income splitting
(available to married couples in
community property states)

URI

UNA

is functionally
equivalent to

1948-Style Joint Filing:
rate brackets twice as large
as individual brackets
(available to all married couples)

UNA

+
URI

1948-style joint returns are also referred to as producing "pure income
splitting" since they replicate the results of the pre-1948 system as it applied
to married couples in community property states (i.e., "separate filing with
income splitting").
We have already seen how pure income splitting created a significant
"marriage bonus" for unequal earners like Uri and Una, who each paid the
same m taxes as they would if they were two single taxpayers making
$50,000.
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Note that under the 1948-style system, equal-earner spouses enjoyed no
advantage (or disadvantage) relative to their unmarried counterparts.
Consider, e.g., Esteban and Edith who each earn $50,000. Since they already
earn the same amount, they have no opportunity to shift high bracket
income to a lower bracket; they already pay exactly the same as two single
people making $50,000 each.
Mter the 1948 reform, singles' rights advocates felt that the marriage
bonus associated with pure income splitting unfairly discriminated against
unmarried taxpayers. To address this concern, in 1969, Congress replaced
"pure income splitting" with a new system that reduced the marriage bonus
and inadvertently created a marriage penalty.
The 1969 reform reduced the marriage bonus by adjusting the rate
schedule applicable to married joint filers. (For simplicity, I will ignore the
153
head of household and married filing separately categories. ) Instead of
taxing married couples using a schedule with rate brackets twice as large as
those contained in the individual schedule-as was the case between 1948
and 1969-married taxpayers would now be taxed based on a schedule with
rate brackets less than twice as large as those making up the individual
schedule.

Individual
rate structure

1948-Style Joint Filing'
rate brackets twice as large

1g6g-Styleloint Filing'
rate brackets less than twice as

as individual structure

large as individual structure

This structure produced a smaller bonus for one- and unequal-earner
couples and created a penalty for equal earners.
Keeping our hypothetical individual rate structure as a constant, a post1969 approach might set the 35% rate hike in the marrieds' schedule at
$80,000. Thus, under the post-1969 style system, the unequal earners in our
example still enjoy a benefit, because some of the $40,000 subject to the 35%

153.

See supra note 29.
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rate under the individual schedule still gets shifted into the lower 10%
bracket. However, because the point at which the higher bracket kicks in in
the joint filing structure-$80,000-is less than twice as large as the
individual filing bracket-hike marker of $50,000, the maximal benefit of
pure income splitting is no longer available.
Separate Filing
(Uri and Una unmarried)

URI

1948-Style

1969-Style

Married Filing Jointly

Married Filing Jointly

UNA

UNA

+

URI

+

URI

Equal-earner Esteban and Edith on the other hand, whose tax liability
was unaffected by their marital status under 1948-style pure income splitting,
now suffer a "marriage penalty" because they have no income to "split"
(since they already earn the same amount) but they still have to move into
the married filing jointly structure.
In other words, income that was subject to the 10% bracket under the
schedule applicable to unmarried taxpayers becomes subject to the higher,
35% bracket, once Esteban and Edith marry.
Separate Filing
(Esteban and Edith unmarried)

ESTEBAN

EDITH

1948-Style

1969-Style

Married Filing Jointly

Married Filing Jointly

EDITH

EDITH

ESTEBAN

ESTEBAN

[2006]
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The 2001 Revenue Act changed the post-1969 system by making the
brackets applicable to married couples' aggregate income twice as large as
those applicable to singles, but only at lower brackets. In other words, it
returned pure income splitting at lower brackets but maintained, and in
some cases exacerbated, the penalty for higher income equal earners.
Specifically, the 10% and 15% brackets applicable to marrieds filing
jointly are now twice as large as those applicable to singles, but starting at
the margin between the 25% and the 28% rate brackets, the married
brackets are less than twice as large as the individual brackets, producing a
1969-style penalty.

2006

Individual and Married Filing Jointly rate structures

S3J6,550-188,450
< 2 x IJJ6,550-154,8oo)

$188,450-12),700
< 2 X (154,800-74,200)

$12J,700-61,JOO
< 2 x (74,2oo-Jo,65o)

$61,)00-15,100
~ 2 x (Jo,650-7,550)
$15,100
~2X7,550

1567
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Thus, under 2001-style rates, Esteban and Edith suffer no marriage
penalty if each spouse's taxable income is $30,000,
2006 Joint Filing:
No Marriage Penalty for Equal Earners at Lower Rate Brackets

ESTEBAN

EDITH

EDITH

+

ESTEBAN

ESTEBAN

$7,550 X 10%

+ $22,450

X 15%

EDITH $7,550 X10%
+ $22,450 X15%

EDITH+ ESTEBAN

$15,100 X 10%

+ $44,900 X 15%

$4,122.5

$8,245

total tax, $8,245
after tax income' $51,755

total tax, $8,245
after tax income' $51,755

[2006]
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... but if each spouse's taxable income is $300,000, they would be better off
unmarried than married, i.e., they suffer a significant marriage penalty.
2006 Joint Filing: Significant Marriage Penalty for High-Income Equal Earners

ESTEBAN

EDITH

EDITH
ESTEBAN

$7,550 X 10%

EDITH+ ESTEBAN $15,100 X 10%

+ $23,100 X 15%
+ $43,550 X 25%
+ $8o,6oo x 28%
+ $145,200 X 33%

+ $23,100 X 15%
+ $43.550 X 25%
+ $8o,6oo x 28%
+ $145,200 X 33%

+ S46,zoo x , s%
+ $62,400 X 25%
+ $64,750 X 28%
+ $148,100 X 33%
+ $263,450 X 35%

$85,591-5

$85.591-5

ESTEBAN

$7,550 X 10%

EDITH

total tax, $171,183

after tax income: $428,817

total tax, $183,250.5
aftertax income, $416,749.5

